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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The enactment of Montana House Bill ^55» the Professional
Negotiations Act for Teachers, on July 1, 1971 provided the structure
for collective action by Montana's Public School Teachers.

This

statute formalized the employment relationship between teachers and
their school districts, and as such, dealt with major questions of
law, philosophy, and procedure concerning the right of public school
teachers to bargain collectively with their employer.

The intention

of this study is to examine the sections of this act that deal with
unit determination, scope of bargaining, and impasse procedures, in
an attempt to determine their effect on collective negotiations in
the field of public education.

While these specific sections can be

examined objectively, the rationale that produced them can not be
accurately determined.

Three divergent professional organizations,

the Montana Education Association, the Montana School Board Associa
tion, and the Montana Federation of Teachers, attempted to provide the
contemplative framework for Montana's collective negotiation statute.
The resulting legislation was a compromise derived from the drafts
submitted by these competing professional organizations.

The reali

ties of this dynamic political situation, in which competing philoso
phies were compromised, is not within the scope of this study.
1

2
A comparative analysis is offered between House Bill 455 and a
proposed collective negotiation statute, with an examination of the
assumptions upon which the proposed legislation is predicated.

Na

tional and state historical background information is furnished in
an attempt to expose the maze of variform legislation that exists in
the field of collective negotiations in public education.

The unique

ness of public education is probed in order to establish a set of
assumptions concerning collective negotiations that can be utilized
to determine the relationship between private employee, public employee
and public education legislation.

These data supply a frame of ref

erence for examination of House Bill 455 and the proposed legislation.
A copy of each statute is provided (Appendix I and Appendix II).

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

National Background
National Teacher Movement
During the 1970-71 school year the National Education Association estimated that 132 teachers strikes occurred in 1? states.

1

These work stoppages are an indication of the growing dissatisfaction
teachers feel not only with their working conditions and salaries, but
with their role in the educational process.

2

Virgil Blanke identified

six social forces that have contributed to the drive for collective
teacher action:

(1) the elimination of paternalistic administrations,

(2 ) the emasculation of the teacher role within large and complex
school systems, (3 ) increased teacher anxiety and insecurity due to
organizational complexity, (4) the increasingly difficult task of
gaining material resources from public taxes, (5 ) the increase in the
number of teachers who are vitally concerned about controlling their
vocational careers, and (6 ) the membership fight between the National
1
"Strikes Decrease, Negotiations Increase in Past Year, NEA
Reports," Montana Education, September, 1971* p* 16.

2

"Teacher Unrest-Cause or Cure," Montana Education, November,
1967, p. 4.

3

k
Education Association and the American Federation of Teachers.

3

Stimulated by these social forces and spearheaded by resolute
organizations public school teachers are demanding that collective
negotiations and bilateral decision-making replace the traditional
system of brief pro forma hearings and unilateral board decisions.
A teacher movement is rapidly becoming a factor in many school
systems, particularly in large urban areas, and the teachers, or at
least their leaders, are talking about full partnership in the educatxonal enterprise.

5

The dramatic 1960-62 strikes by the United Federation of
Teachers, emphasized the need for drastic changes in public education

g
employment relationships.

The collective bargaining elections and

subsequent precedent-setting agreements sparked a demand for collective
action by public school teachers across the country.

7

The legal

endorsement for this collective action was provided by the Federal
Government upon the issuance of Executive Order 10988, which grants
to employees of the federal government some of the same rights to

■^Virgil E. Blanke, "Teachers in Search of Power," The Educational
Forum, January, 1966, p. 235»
if.
Robert E. Doherty, Joan R. Egner and William T. Lowe, The
Changing Employment Relationship in Public Schools: Implications for
Quality Education, (Ithaca, Cornell University, 1966), p. 9.
5
Alan Rosenthal, "Administrator-Teacher Relations: Harmony or
Conflict," Public Administration Review, June, 196?, p. 15^«

g
Charles Cogen, "Changing Patterns of Employment Relations," in
The Changing Employment Relationship in Public Schools: Implications
for Quality Education, comp, by Robert E. Doherty, Joan R. Egner and
William T. Lowe, (Ithaca, Cornell University, 1966), p. 9.

c;

-V

negotiate with employers that are used by employees in the private
o
sector.
"There is no question,” according to Cornell University
Professor Robert Doherty,
... that this legal endorsement of bilateral determination of
employment conditions has encouraged collective activity, and
when we couple this development with effects of the increasing
percentage of men teachers, the growing rivalry between the two
major teacher organizations, and the impact of mounting frustra
tions in public school teaching, one can only predict that
thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, more teachers will
„
shortly be covered by formal and elaborate collective agreements.
Doctor H. T. James described the changes taking place in teacherschool board relations to the 1965 White House Conference on Education
as follows:
The teaching profession is now engaged in a nationwide struggle to
promote its interests directly with boards of education, thus
removing the need for reliance or intervention by any level of the
administrative line. This struggle has been viewed with some
alarm by those who would label it a dangerous intrusion of labormanageraent concepts into a professional realm. My own conclusion
is that it is no such thing, but is rather a struggle by profession
als to achieve the right, rather generally accepted in western
civilization, to be governed by written rules developed with in
volvement and consent and not by the caprices of men. American
schools are still among the most authoritarian institutions in our
society, and the revolution now in progress may be needed as badly
as was the elimination of partisan politics from the teacher re
cruitment process after the turn of the century. The substitution
of written law and due process for the ubiquitous influence peddlar has always been viewed as progress after its accomplishment...
The legitimate function of the school administration should be
easier to perform after the new agreements are drawn, and the great
majority of able and qualified professional school administrators
will welcome the change.^

8

Allan M. West, "The Changing Relationship in Public Schools:
Implications for Quality Education,” in The Changing Employment, comp,
by Doherty, Egner and Lowe, p. 20.
9

Robert E. Doherty, "Letter to a School Board," ilr, February,
196?, p. 272.
"^H. Thomas James, "Can Urban Schools Be Managed?," The White
House Conference on Education (consultant papers),(Washington, D.C.,
1965), p. 156.

6
NEA-AFT Rivalry
The National Education Association and the American Federation
of Teachers (AFL-CIO) are both attempting with differing and com
peting approaches, to provide the organizational structure for col
lective action by public school teachers.

They are endeavoring to

secure the passage of state laws guaranteeing to teacher groups the
right to recognition and bargaining.

The joint determination by

school boards, school administrations, and teacher organizations of
salaries, working conditions, and in some instances curriculum and
methodology appears to be part of the apparent goal of both organiza
tions.
The decisive 1961 collective bargaining victory of the American
Federation of Teachers in New York City had the effect of spurring the
conflict between the NEA and the AFT, and their apparently disparate
approaches to collective action by public school teachers.

The

American Federation of Teachers is an employee-oriented organization
committed to the principles and goals of trade unionism, and affiliated
with organized labor.

11

Procedurally this involves, not only the

tactics of collective bargaining, but also the use of a militant stance,
exclusion of administrators from teacher organizations, picketing,
rallies, and the strike as a last resort in very serious situations.
The National Education Association is a non-labor affiliated, pro11

# Carl J. Megel, ’’Significance of the New York City Teachers
Collective Bargaining Elections,” American Teacher, February, 1962,
backcover.

12

7
fessionally oriented organization which includes both teachers and
administrators and utilizes the concept of professional negotiations.

13

These two competing organizations are more pragmatic than the
oretical, and have employed a barage of semantic differentiation,
while attempting to organize the same group of workers, in order to
accomplish approximately the same objectives.

There is no basic

perceivable distinction between the American Federation of Teachers'
concept of collective bargaining and the National Education Associa
tion's concept of professional negotiations as employed by their local
affiliates.

While the national organizations have established poli

cies on such issues as the inclusion or exclusion of supervisory
personnel, the local organizations include or exclude various cate
gories of supervisory personnel based on political practicality rather
than policy.

In many cases, particularly in the militant locals, the

only means of distinguishing an American Federation of Teachers1 local
from a National Education Association's local rest with the local's
choice of vocabulary and national affiliation.

Collective Bargaining - A Form of Collective Action
Classically the authority (as distinct from the skill and in
spiration) to create and implement educational policy has been the
province of the school board and administrators, on the one hand, and
taxpayers, on the other.
In recent years the aspirations of teach>_____________
13
NEA, Department of Classroom Teachers, Classroom Teachers Speak
on Professional Negotiation (Washington, D.C., NEA, 19&3)» PP« 3-5*
14
Morris E. Lasker, "The Influence of Teacher Collective Bar
gaining on the Quality of Education: Observations of a Board Nego
tiator," in Changing Employment, comp, by Doherty, Egner and Lowe, p.30.

8
ers, supported in many places by public opinion and recognized in
many by public authority, whether it be the President of the United
States, state legislatures, or municipal executives, have been al
tering the traditional power structure to diffuse the decision-making
responsibilities between school boards and teachers.

15

Growing num

bers of teachers are demanding a more regular, formalized, and sys
tematic procedure for resolving differences between themselves as a
group and school boards.

Some form of collective negotiations between

representatives of the teacher group and the school board are being
implemented in many school systems as a means of formally admitting
teachers to the educational decision-making process.

16

Collective

negotiation establishes a legally sanctioned confrontation between
the elected representatives of the teachers and the representatives
of the school board in order to determine jointly a set of terms and
conditions under which the members of the teacher group will consent
to work.

17

This procedure provides a democratic process for the re

solution of existing conflicts; it does not create artificial con
flicts.

Relations between school boards and teachers have always

evidenced strains arising from the clash between the professional
norm of individual autonomy for the classroom teacher and the bur
eaucratic requirements of heirochial authority in a school system.^

15Ibid.
l6Ibid.
17
George H. Hilderbrand, "Collective Bargaining in the Public
Sector: An Analytical View," (unpublished paper, Cornell University,
1966), p. 2 .
18
Rosenthal, "Harmony or Conflict", p. 154.

This conflict of interest betvfeen teachers and school boards has
intensified as teachers have become more professional, and more
interested in improving their school systems.

19

’’Professionalization,1’

according to Doctor R. G. Corwin, "is a militant process which contributes to rates of organizational conflict."

20

Collective negotia

tions are providing a channel for this organizational conflict, while
serving to revitalize the role of the public school teacher.

This

new procedure is raising the teachers' professional self-image and
helping transform teachers from docile time-serving bureaucrats into
virile professionals, intent upon preserving their due measure of
autonomy.^
This new policy making process in the public schools is not an
ephemeral movement.

Like all human institutions, collective negotia

tion, whether in public education or elsewhere, is a tool that may be
productively or destructively used.

22

The interest of teachers, which

certainly include the right to influence school policy and the condi
tions of their employment, must be balanced with the interest of a so
ciety which is relying today more than ever on the public school, to
19Cogen, "Changing Patterns," in Changing Employment, comp, by
Doherty, Egner and Lowe, p. 13.

20
Ronald G. Corwin, "The Development of an Instrument for
Examining Staff Conflicts in the Public Schools," Cooperative Research
Project No. 193^, Office of Ed., United States Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, 1963-196^, quoted from the summary of the final
report, pp. 12-15.
21

Charles S. Benson, "Economic Problems of Education Associated
with Collective Negotiation," in Changing Employment, comp, by Doherty,
Egner and Lowe, p. 2.
^^Lasker, "Observations," in Changing Employment, comp, by
Doherty, Egner and Lowe, p.
.

10
help bring about broad social improvements.

23

Teacher benefits may

be emphasized at the expense of student welfare, bargaining issues
may become politically distorted, and the administration may be
eclipsed.

These possible adverse effects must be considered with

the potential for improved teacher morale, the introduction of
creative educational ideas, the consideration of the needs of the
district as a whole, and the presentation of a unified stance to the
taxpayers.

24

The results of collective negotiations within public

education will be constructive, if we accept the assumption that
those responsible will discharge their obligation to the children of
America.

Professor Robert Doherty accepts this assumption as one of

the main tenets upon which our public school system is predicated,
and conclusions that, "...American experience has proved that this
assumption is valid and that collective negotiation in the schools,
responsibly exercised, will be a force for the improvement of the
quality of education."2-'*
One is hesitant to draw too close a parallel between problems
arising out of teacher-school board relations and corresponding
situations in private sector collective bargaining.

Certainly the

differences between public and private employment are significant and
far reaching.

Collective negotiations may not be the ideal method for

resolving labor disputes in public education.

23Ibid.
2/fIbid., pp. 32-33.
25Ibid., p. 34.

However, serious concerns

are raised when this alternative is denied to public school teachers,
sind public education is left to the vagsiries of crisis bargaining.

26

Employees, whether public or private, engage in collective action to
incresuse their bargaining power.

They want a variety of things not

readily available through individual bargaining.

To prohibit col

lective action does not erase the "wants", it simply diverts or represses them.

27

If we accept the previously stated fact that teacher-

school board conflict is unavoidable, then a means of accomodating
these competing interests must be established.

It is the success of

collective bargaining as a process to channel conflict in the private
sector that has led to the demands for its extension to the public
20
sector and the field of public education.

Divergent Forms of State Legislation
Since public education is a function of the state, the teacher
movement has concentrated on the passage of state collective negotia
tion legislation to replace what has been essentia3.1y ad hoc tinkering.

29

Unfortunately, thxs effort has been retarded by a tendency

among state legislatures to regard collective negotiations by public
servants, including teachers, as a question of law rather than as a
matter of public policy.''50

An elaborate legal argument,the doctrine

26
William R. Hazard, "Teachers and Collective Bargaining:
National Dilemma," Public Personnel Review, July, 1968, p. 130.

A

27Ibid., p. 131.

28G. W. Taylor, "Public Interest in Collective Negotiations in
Education," Phi- Delta Kappan, September, 1966, p. 23.
29
1
Hazard, "National Dilemma," p. 13^.

12
of political sovereignty, has been constructed on the tenet that law
makers can not share their publicly delegated rule-making responsibilities with a group of employees.

31

This circuitous legal reasoning

prevents an analysis of the issues from the vantage point of public
policy, and provides the rationale for the continuation of a unilat
eral power structure in public education.

However, state legislatures

have begun to consider and pass legislation designed to provide for
collective negotiations between teachers and school boards in the
various states.
Twenty-eight states have statutes providing for some form of
collective negotiation in public education,

32

while m

others, school

boards are forbidden, by either court and/or attorney general ruling,
statute or constitutional amendment, to allow teachers to enter for
mally into the educational decision-making process.

The states have

granted or denied the rights necessary to collective teacher action in
varying degrees.

Some states have enacted enabling statutes which

merely permit negotiations if both parties request them, i/hile others
compel school boards to bargain, if a majority of the teachers in the
school system indicate a desire to negotiate.

Before teachers can

engage in collective action they must secure the right to organize
# and the right to obtain recognition, and subsequently the opportunity
to bargain over at least some substantive matters.

33

A maze of vari

form alternatives have emerged from the state legislatures in their
31

Hilderbrand, "Collective Bargaining," p. 13^-.

32

"Strikes Decrease," p. 16.

■^Hilderbrand, "Collective Bargaining," p. 5.

attempts to deal with these issues.
Wisconsin became an early leader and enacted a collective ne
gotiation statute grouping public school teachers with other munici
pal employees, except law enforcement employees.

Numerous state

legislatures followed this model of grouping teachers with other
public employees, while adding various qualifications to the statutes
jurisdiction.

The New York statute covers all public employees ex

cept organized militia, the Michigan statute excludes civil service
employees of the state, and the New Jersey statute, while not ex
cluding any category of public employees, excludes supervisory per
sonnel in all categories.

The Wisconsin legislation confers the

jurisdiction over these employees upon the state labor agencies
operating in the private sector.

While Michigan's legislature

adopted this alternative, several states, including New York, cre
ated separate labor agencies to deal with the problems of public
employee relations.

The Connecticut legislature created a separate

statute covering collective negotiations in public education, and
provided educational channels, rather than labor channels, for the
resolution of teacher-school board disputes.

Many of the state le

gislatures that have followed this alternative have enacted legislation covering public employees other than teachers which confers jur
isdiction on the state labor agencies or on a separate public employe
relations board.

Minnesota and several other states have enacted

separate teacher legislation, but provide labor or legal oriented
34
procedures for impasse resolution.
34
Jean T. McKelvey, "The Role of State Agencies in Public
Employee Relations," ilr, January, 1967, pp. 187-188.

14
These divergent state laws have created dissimilar procedures
for unit determination, and impasse resolution.

For example, some

statutes, like the Hawaii statute, permit teacher strikes, others,
like the New York statute, prohibit strikes, and some, like the
Minnesota statute, do not mention the issue.

35

The diverse provisions

of these various statutes can be grouped in four basic categories:
(1) representation, (2) negotiation, (3) impasse, and (4) administrative provisions.

The representation provisions determine who shall

be covered by the statute and the type of coverage.

The negotiation

provisions determine the scope of the issues that may be raised at
the bargaining table, as well as the mechanics of the negotiating
procedure.

The impasse provisions determine the method of resolving

disputes which arise during contract negotiations, and the procedure
for resolving grievances.

The administrative provisions determine the

organizational structure that is necessary to administer the law.

37

Each category provides the legislators with a myriad of alternatives
that can be combined in limitless variety.

Montana Background
Collective Teacher Action
The editorial comment in the November 1967 issue of Montana
Education advised school boards and administrators that teacher unrest
35

Robert E. Doherty, "The Impact of Teacher Organizations Upon
Setting School Policies," ilr, May, 1966, p. 516.
36

Robert E. Doherty and Walter E. Oberer, Teachers, School
Boards and Collective Bargaining: A Changing of the Guard (Ithaca:
Cayuga Press, 1967), p. 46.
^McKelvey, "State Agencies," p. 183.

15
would exist in Montana "until teachers are provided salaries fully
commensurate with the social significance of the teaching profession,
as well as a greater role in policy development and other forms of
school decision-making about curriculum, working conditions and other
personnel policies."

38

The Montana Education Association not only

identified the causes of teacher unrest but proposed voluntary written
agreements, which provide for communication with teachers, boards, and
administration on matters of mutual concern, entered into and carried
out in good faith, as the method by which this turmoil and unrest could
be avoided and minimized in Montana.

39

The 8,000 member Montana Education Association^ and the 700 member Montana Federation of Teachers

41

attempted to implement bilateral

decision-making agreements in the school systems across the state.

The

Montana Federation of Teachers labeled this process "collective bar
gaining," while the Montana Education Association preferred the term
"professional negotiation."

The Montana Education Association's def

inition of professional negotiation as a process, written and agreed
to by the school board and the professional association that sets forth
the intent of both parties to discuss, through their designated repre
sentatives, questions relating to conditions of work and such other
38

"Teacher Unrest," p. 4.

39Ibid.
40

"Reorganization Proposal Stirs MEA," Great Falls Tribune,
April 1, 1970, p. 2.
41

"Federation of Teachers Lists Convention Agenda," Great Falls
Tribune, October 19, 1970, p. 3-

16
matters as may be mutually agreed to,

42

could be used by the Montana

Federation of Teachers as a definition of collective bargaining by
merely substituting the word union for "professional association" and
bargain for "discuss".
The Montana School Board Association at least partially endorsed
this concept of bilateral decision-making by recommending to its
membership "that they adopt the MEA's proposed professional policies
agreement in such degree as is mutually satisfactory to local boards
and MEA units."

43

Montana School Board Association and the Montana

Education Association adopted this posture of voluntary cooperation
in the absence of any state statute requiring or providing for local
teacher-school board agreements, and neither party formally pursued
the development of a collective negotiations statute.

This interchange

of ideas excluded the Montana Federation of Teachers.
Owen Nelson, teacher special services director for the Montana
Education Association, established as an immediate goal for 1969 a good
written professional agreement in each Montana school system.

44

While

the majority of Montana's public school teachers were being heard by
school boards on matters of mutual concern, the process was one of
consultation not bargaining.

The Montana Education Association mounted

•

a drive to alter the procedure by reducing to writing matters of mutual

^*TDee Cooper, "Professional Negotiation, What Is It?," Montana
Education (news edition), November, 1968, p. 4.
43

"MSBA Endorses MEA's Professional Policies Agreement, Montana
Education (news edition), November, 1968, p. 1.
44

Owen Nelson, "PN Agreements are Needed in Every Montana School
System, Montana Education, December, 1968, p. 2.

17
concern, thus formalizing and institutionalizing the negotiation pro
cess.

By March 1969, 35 per cent of Montana's public school teachers

were covered by written professional negotiation agreements which
conformed closely to the sample "Professional Policies Agreement" that
was distributed by the Montana Education Association and recommended
by the Montana School Board Association.

By April 1970, 88 local

Montana Education Association affiliates had requested professional
negotiation agreements with their school boards.

Fifty succeeded,

38 were turned down, and another 37 locals did not request xvritten
bargaining agreements.

46

This drive for written professional agree

ments by the Montana Education Association sparked a membership drive
by the Montana Federation of Teachers, and awoke the Montana School
Board Association to the fact that professional negotiations were in
the field of public education and the state of Montana to stay.
Montana experienced its first teacher strike in April 1970.
This strike by the Butte local of the Montana Federation of Teachers
i
47
effected 450 teachers and nearly 10,000 students,
and made the pub
lic aware of the changes occuring in teacher-school board relations
around the state.

During this period each of these three competing

^professional organizations began to draft legislation to protect their

-'"35 Per Cent of Montana's Teachers Have PN," Montana Education,
(News edition), March, 1969, p. 3*
46

"Educators Seek Law to Bargain," Great Falls Tribune, April,
1970, p. 1.
47

"Teachers' strike is Settled in Butte," Great Falls Tribune,
April 14, 1970, p. 1.

18
vested interests and support their particular variety of collective
negotiations.

Proposed Legislation
Collective negotiations statutes, dealing directly or indirectly
with public school teachers, have been introduced during Montana leg
islative sessions in widely variant forms.

The 1969 Montana legisla

ture considered two divergent drafts of collective negotiation legis
lation which grouped teachers with other public employees.

Senate Bill

256 would have granted public employers and public employees the right
to bargain collectively with jurisdiction being conferred on the State
Department of Labor and Industry.

Representation elections, exclusive

representation, and unfair labor practices were some of the provisions
included in the statute.

During the same legislative session House

Bill 512 was introduced to exclude collective bargaining from the pub
lic sector.

These two opposing statutes were designed to provide leg

al endorsement or condemnation for the increasing collective action by
Montana teachers.

Neither statute became lav/, and the legal status

of collective negotiations in public education remained unanswered.
Jlo state law prohibited teacher-school board negotiations, or permitted
such negotiations.

They existed only with the consent of the local

school board.
During the years between the 1969 and the 1971 legislative
sessions the three professional organizations involved in teacher-school
board negotiations (MBA, MSBA, and STFT) began to draft statutes to
provide the guidelines for collective teacher action in Montana.

The

Montana Education Association drafted a bill that would give all state

19
and local public employees collective bargaining rights with limited
power to strike.

A Public Employees Relations Board would have been

created by the legislation, and would have had the power to halt or
set conditions on a strike if it endangered public health or safety.
Public employees would have been permitted to strike, but only after a
long process involving mediation, fact-finding, a 60-day waiting per
iod and 10 days notice of intent to strike.

The proposed statute would

have made it mandatory for school boards and other public employers to
bargain with employees on wages, ’working conditions and other matters.
The Montana School Board Association formed a collective bargain
ing law for teachers thus separating public education from other forms
of public employment.

The draft included sections excluding adminis

trators from negotiations, setting limits on v/hat is negotiable, de
fining unfair labor practices, and creating a "master teacher plan".
Teachers would have been prevented from striking, school boards would
have been compelled to meet with teacher groups, and tenure laws would
have been amended under this proposed statute.

The public instruction

superintendent v/ould be used for hearings and mediation procedures under
the proposed act.^8
»
The Montana Federation of Teachers developed a statute recog
nizing the right of professional educators to bargain collectively
and conferring jurisdiction on the State Department of Labor and In
dustry.

The statute included provisions for exclusive representation,

representation elections, mediation and fact-finding, and unfair labor
practices.

No reference was made in the statute concerning the issue

*f8
"Power to Strike Put in MEA Bill," Great Falls Tribune,
November 30, 1970, p. 2.

20
l±a

of teacher strikes.
Four statutes concerning collective negotiations in public
education were introduced during the 1971 Montana legislative session.
Organized labor submitted a collective bargaining statute concerning
public employees, including public school teachers, administered by
the State Department of Labor and Industry.

The Montana Federation of

Teachers, while supporting in principle the public employee statute
submitted by organized labor, for reasons of political practicality
introduced the statute previously described covering only public school
teachers.

The Montana Education Association adopted this same alter

native of a limited statute covering only public school teachers in an
effort to develop a joint statute with the Montana School Board Asso
ciation.

These two organizations attempted through a joint committee

to develop a single statute for submission to the state legislature.
However, unresolved differences concerning the right to strike and the
scope of negotiations caused each organization to submit a separate
draft.'*0
The statute submitted by organized labor, House Bill 165, was
quickly diluted and eventually defeated.

House Bill 264 and House

Bill 123, the Montana Federation of Teachers and the Montana Education
Association statutes, were killed without discussion by the House, and
only the Montana School Board Association statute, House Bill 455* was
49
50

'‘Educators Seek Law to Bargain,” p. 1.

"School Board Advisor Shies Away From 'Pro-Teacher' Bargain
ing,” Great Falls Tribune, October 9, 1970, p. 6.

21
d e b a t e d . A f t e r a process of several amendments House Bill 455
became Montana law and established the framework for teacher action.
This statute is not a perfect statute, but is a start in the right
direction by providing the framework within which to develop nego
tiation procedures bett^een teachers and school boards throughout the
state.
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CHAPTER III

UNIQUENESS OF PUBLIC EDUCATION

Public Education Employment Relationships
Public education is a unique enterprise in that the normal
employee-employer relationships can be transcended by a mutual re
lationship in which teachers, administrators, and school boards
strive to provide the best possible education for the children of
their district.

This mutual relationship would not eliminate the

traditional employee-employer relationships with their inevitable
problems and essential differences of interest, but would provide
the parties involved with a common perspective for analyzing issues
of mutual concern.

The teaching profession is presently engaged in

a struggle to determine which one of these two relationships will
provide the direction for collective negotiations in public education.
Our culture has developed an array of myths and pieces of
folklore in an attempt to deny the applicability of the employeeemployer relationship to white-collar employment situations,
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but

the fact remains that essential differences of interest do exist
between those who are employed and those who employ, regardless of
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Jack Barbash, "Union Philosophy and the Professional,"
American Federation of Teachers - AFL-CIO, No. 22, p. ^t.

22

23
the character of the work.
exception.

The field of public education is no

School boards and administrators want greater flexibility

in operating the public schools, while teachers want more professional
and individual autonomy.

Once this conflict of interest is recognized,

the fact that neither side can be trusted to adequately protect the
interest of the other must be accepted.

The only practical method

to resolve these differences is by an accommodation that is mutually
acceptable to both parties,
reject the other.
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and one that permits either party to

Collective bargaining can provide public education

with a system of due process for the resolution of these employeeemployer differences.
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While it is important to realize that these labor relations
problems do exist in public education, the potential contained in
professional educational relationships must be given maximum consider
ation.

If all educators, whether as teacher, administrator, or trustee,

place the welfare of the children in their district as their first
responsibility,
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then collective negotiations can provide an orderly

means of bilateral decision-making where teachers and school boards can
pool their expertise for the advancement of education.
5^
y Ibid., p. 2 .
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Quality Education and Collective Teacher Action
Collective teacher action and quality education can not he considered as completely independent phenomena.

60

Teachers engage in

collective action in an effort to alter their role in the educational
decision-making process.

The changes that are produced in teacher

employment relations by this collective action will have an impact
on the manner in which schools are operated and the kind of education
students receive.

The quality of education can be influenced by

changes in three braod areas:

(1) the content of the curriculum,

(2) the mechanical structure employed to transmit the curriculum,
and (3) the actual teaching procedures.^

As teacher organizations

attempt to influence factors in these three categories, they will
effect the quality of education in public schools.
The Professional Negotiations Act for Teachers "...recognizes
teaching as a profession which requires special educational qualifica
tions and that to achieve high quality education it is indispensable
that good relations exist between teaching personnel and their gov
erning boards" (Appendix XI).

The traditional power structure in

ptiblic education has alienated the faculties from administrators and
is a real threat to effective education.

Collective negotiations

have the potential to reverse this trend and alter the power structure
for the improvement of quality education.

The understanding and

sense of joint responsibility engendered by participation could help
to improve the execution of educational policy, and the additional

^Doherty, Egner and Lowe, Changing Employment, p. ii.
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Lasker, "Observations," in Changing Employment, comp, by
Doherty, Egner and Lox^e, p. 30-
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skill and knowledge that is applied by formally incorporating teachers
in the decision-making process would hopefully produce more effective
decisions.

Where teachers have worked on a problem, shared in devel

oping alternatives, and participated in decision-making, they will
undoubtedly be more willing to implement policy and adapt to promulgated change.
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On the other hand, the primary function of any em

ployee organization is to improve the well-being of its membership
and to enhance their established rights.

Historically in the private

sectors this involved a minimization of the impact of change upon
incumbents.
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If teacher organizations assume this function, the

collective agreements negotiated could create rigid situations at a
time when the public interest clearly demands adaptability from the
public schools.

Collective negotiations can, therefore, be a means

whereby the creative spirit of the teaching staff can be harnessed for
the advancement of education,
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or it can be a process for reducing

administrative flexibility in responding to changing educational con
ditions.
The effect that collective negotiations will have on the quality
• of public education will to a large extent be determined by the teach
er's self-image.

If teachers perceive their role in the educational

system as predominately an employee-employer relationship, then their
organizations will pursue the private sector approach to collective

62Rosenthal, "Harmony or Conflict," p. 156.
Stuart L. Openlander, "Negotiation - Which Road to Follow?,"
The School Administrator, February, 1969, p- 2.
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bargaining.

Their collective power will be used to demand action or

inaction along a particular line, with primary emphasis being given
to the concerns of the membership.
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However, if teachers perceive

their role as that of a professional, then collective negotiations
can become an avenue for the expression of their competence on educa
tional issues.

While their collective power could be used to demand

action or inaction along a particular line, the primary emphasis be
comes the welfare of the students, not the advancement of the member
ships' special interests.

The acceptance of this professional respon

sibility does not mean that teachers would subsidize education with
inadequate salaries, or that school boards would capitulate to every
teacher demand, rather it means all educators, teachers, administrators,
and trustees would share a mutual relationship in which the welfare of
the student is paramount.

This professional responsibility does not

preclude conflicts from accompanying negotiations and might, even, as
was pointed out above, cause increased conflict as teachers attempt to
broaden their influence in the school system.

Conflicts, however, are

not always divisive and are often responsible for progress.
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Scope of Collective Negotiations
In probing collective teacher action, the issue is not the
uniqueness of public education per se, but rather the uniqueness of the
application of collective bargaining in public education.
65
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If teacher
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organizations voluntarily or through legislation assume the posture
of merely economic representatives, and bargain solely over wages
and working conditions, then the differences between teacher-school
board relations and other public employee-employer relations will be
minute.

However, if teacher organizations pursue professional goals

through collective negotiations, then teacher-school board relations
will become increasingly unique as more areas of professional activity
are brought to the bargaining table.
Any attempt to predict the future of educational negotiation
is fraught with the danger of oversimplification, however, it seems
reasonable to assume though presently concerned with gaining power
through the negotiation process to improve salaries, expand fringe
benefits, and improve working conditions, teachers are not likely to
let these remain their exclusive concerns.^

The subject matter of

negotiations may eventually be as broadly defined as the education
program itself, as teachers seek to resolve the dissatisifaction they
feel with their role in the educational process.

As classroom teachers

become recognized as essential and constructive factors in the educa
tional decision-making process, the collective strength necessary to
transfer teaching into a legitimate dynamic profession may be provided.
Teachers are in some respects an enigmatic group, uncertain as
to the direction they want collective negotiations to follow.

They

appear to want the status of a professional and often equate themselves
with doctors and lawyers, while often pursuing the level of responsi67

Openlander, "Negotiation," p. 2 .
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bility associated with organized labor.
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It is vital that teachers

accept the fact that, if they expect to negotiate over so-called pro
fessional issues, they will have to accept the responsibilities of
being professionals.

The authority of a profession is rooted in com-

petence and skill, not in legal power or collective action.
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Teachers

must accept this reality, and recognize that the only basis upon which
they can legitimately participate in decisions concerning curriculum,
teacher recruitment, class size, and textbook selection, is expert
knowledge.
If it is in the public interest for teacher organizations to
bargain over more than the wages and working conditions traditional in
private sector collective bargaining, then the public has the right
to expect that professional advice will be based upon skill and compe
tence, not upon irrelevant concerns*

The Kingsport Press case demon

strates the application of one such irrelevant concern to the selection
of textbooks.

The Kingsport Press is one of the largest integrated

printers in the nation, printing for, among others, McGraw-Hill, Lippincott, Grolier, Field Enterprises, Holt, Rinehart, and Harper and
Row.

Five unions, representing the 2,200 workers of Kingsport Press

went on strike on March 11, 1963, but the company continued to operate
with supervisors, new hires, and returning strikers.

Finding them

selves unable to win the strike, the five unions called upon the AFLCIO for help.

The American Federation of Teachers, a member of the

68A1 Smith, "Technician or Professional," (paper presented in
partial fulfillment for course ILR 607, Cornell University, 1968), p. 1.
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the APL-CIO, urged its members not to use textbooks printed at Kings
port, and demanded that boards of education not buy books printed
there.
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A number of school boards capitulated in varying degrees to

the teachers' pressure to institute "secondary boycotts" by restricting
the purcha.se of books from Kingsport Press.
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The focal point of

this example is not whether the strike at Kingsport Press was jus
tified or not, but rather that only one standard can properly be
used in the selection of textbooks, and that is how well the textbooks
serve the educational process.

Professional educators must not uti

lise their collective strength to support a particular vested inter
est or allow interest groups to shape our educational policies.
Teacher organisations can also supplant educational competence
during collective negotiations by focusing on the needs of their mem
bership.

One aspect of "wide scope negotiations" where this might

be true is in the participation by teachers in the establishment of
teaching standards and teacher education programs.

Teacher organisa

tions seem to have succumbed to the fiction that competence is some
how synonomous with formal training and longevity, and have supported
typ

the private sector employment concept of "equal pay for equal work."
The test of a profession is its ability to serve others rather than
itself, and until teachers accept this responsibility their self-inter
est will compel the surport of tenure laws and the rejection of teacher

°American Teacher, January, 19-^, p* "18 .
' Lasker, 1’Obcervat 2.ons,1' m
Doherty, Lgner and Lowe, p. 30•

Changing iknployment, comp, by
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merit systems, where their educational expertise might dictate the
opposite position.
These two examples clearly depict the problems that exist in
determining the scope of the educational negotiations.

The legisla

tors' answers to these concerns must be based on their assessment of
the role of teachers in the educational process, employee, or profes
sional.

The challenge is to take the offensive with change, and, with

the use of our imagination and ingenuity, develop procedures which
make use of experience, but recognize the potential contained in the
unique relationships which exist in public education,

73

thus freeing

us from the precedents, institutional loyalties, and stereotypes
associated with private sector employment and predicated on the tra
ditional employee-employer relationships.

Legislative Alternatives
The interpretation of the phrase "terms and conditions of em
ployment" has been a source of dispute in the private sector, and there
is every reason to believe that some controversy will exist in the
public sector.

The matter of what is appropriate content for teacher-

school board collective agreements is a question of public policy that
must be dealt with in the formation of any collective negotiation
statute for public education.

Unfortunately the scope of negotiations

has been used by the courts as a counter balance to compensate public
employees for the loss of the right to strike.

A Wisconsin court has

stated this concern for employee rights as follows:
73
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The right to compel collective bargaining on certain specific
issues was substituted for the employee’s historic right to
strike. This is not precisely a "quid pro quo.” Rather it is
actually the substitution of a lesser for a greater right. Un
der such circumstances the lesser right, i.e., the right to compel
negotiations on issues effecting employment conditions should
be broadly construed to more equitably balance the scale of
justice.
The Montana legislature rejected the broad interpretation of
"terms and conditions of employment," and provided that "...matters
of negotiation and bargaining for agreement shall not include matters
of curriculum, policy of operation, selection of teachers and other
personnel, or physical plant of schools or other school facilities..."
(Appendix I).

The discussion at the bargaining table is therefore

limited to "...matters relating directly to the employer-teacher
relationship such as salary, hours, and other terms of employment..."
(Appendix I).

While the negotiations can not go beyond the narrow

limits of labor precedents, the legislation provides for a dual
system of negotiation and consultation.

Matters relating directly to

the employer-teacher relationship are subject to bilateral decision
making, while all other matters are the responsibility of the school
#board and the administration.

However, school boards are required,

...to meet and confer on any proposal advanced by a representa
tive of teachers, or by a teacher or group of teachers if no
representative of teachers has been elected, if such proposal
does not endeavor to amend the terms of a professional negotia
tions agreement then in effect, and nothing in this act shall be
construed to diminish such duty (Appendix I).
This obligation permits teachers to consult with school boards on
matters of curriculum, but prohibits them from introducing such mat
ters during the bilateral decision-making process of collective
74
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negotiations.

A further restriction is placed on the scope of ne

gotiations by requiring that professional negotiation conferences not
begin until after November 1 of the last year the collective agree
ment is effective, and that the teachers or their representative "...
must serve written notice of intention to negotiate collectively upon
the employer not later than November 1 of such year stating specifically
the items to be negotiated" (Appendix I).
The Professional Negotiations Act for Teachers clearly grants
teachers the "employee" rights of private sector collective bargaining
to joint determination of salary, hours, and other terms of employ
ment, while forcing teachers to assume a mere advisory role on matters
of professional concern.

One would hardly expect or desire that cur

riculum, methodology or educational services be subjected to the pres
sures that inevitably characterize negotiations over conditions of
employment.
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However, while the content of the curriculum should not

be subjected to negotiation, the mechanics for determining the content
should be formulated jointly by teachers and school boards at the bar
gaining table.

The joint determination of such procedures would result

in the inclusion of teachers in the curriculum decision-making process.
Teachers would be provided the opportunity to participate in decisions
on professional matters in an environment which should result in more
knowledgeable decisions.

A sense of professional responsibility is

likely to be developed among participating teachers.

With this alter

native available, there is little reason to debate professional prob75
Myron Lieberman and Michael H. Moskow, Collective Negotiations
for Teachers; An Approach to School Administration (Chicago: Rand Mc
Nally, 196^), p. 244. ~
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lems and make administrative decisions at the negotiating table. In
order for this to be a viable alternative, however, teachers must be
able to assume the role of partners not mere advisors.
The proposed statute states ’'...that the board and the certified
employee organization shall meet at reasonable times and shall nego
tiate in good faith with respect to terms and conditions of employment”
(Appendix II).

No limiting or qualifying statements are included in

the statute to further define the phrase "terms and conditions of employment.”

Therefore we find that the specific items to be negotiated

are themselves negotiable.

This does not mean that school boards

should relinquish the potver of unilateral determination on all subjects
broached by the teachers; it means rather that they should not adopt
a "management rights” stance which precludes discussion, but should
instead demand (i.e. bargain hard for) retention of unilateral control
over matters which, in their judgment, merit such.
The broad scope of negotiations possible under the proposed sta
tute necessitates that the State Department of Education administer
V '‘
’'
the statute. The determination as to what provisions are necessary or
what provisions are detrimental to the advancement of quality educa
tion are matters for professional educators not labor or legal tribu
nals.

The Montana statute with its limited scope of negotiations

utilizes the district court to administer the statute, and emphasizes
the employee-employer aspect of the teacher-school board relationship.
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CHAPTER IV

UNIT DETERMINATION

Guide Lines for Unit Determination
Unit determination in public education is not as colorful an
issue as the question of should public school teachers have the right
to strike or as noticeable to the public as the controversy over im
passe procedures, but it is the necessary first step in any collective
bargaining relationship for it defines the constituency within which
collective negotiations take place.

77

Before the formal process of

collective negotiations can begin, the two parties, who are to nego
tiate, must be established.

The statutes of the various states which

authorize collective negotiations in public education have attempted
to solve the question of who these parties should be in a myriad of
divergent procedures.

The problem comes not with the employer unit,

Tor all the legislatures agree that this should be the local school
board, but with the employee unit.

Who should be included in the

"teacher bargaining" unit and who should be excluded from this unit?
Should exclusive representation be given to one teacher organization?
The determination of the appropriate unit is crucial for it defines
the field on which to play before the contest begins; significantly
effects who the opponents are going to be; and can have far reaching
77
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implications for the contest itself.
All the legislatures that have dealt with the problems of unit
determination have had to answer three basic questions:

(1) what is

an appropriate unit, (2 ) what guide lines should be followed in estab
lishing the unit, and (5) who should establish the unit?

The deter

mination of the unit directly effects the demands and the effective
ness of the representation, the independence of the organization,
the militancy of the organisation, the grievance procedures, and the
efficiency of the school administration.
The following quotation is taken from the dissenting opinion in
the May 17, 1966 decision by the Labor Relations Commission of the Com
monwealth of Massachusetts in a case involving the appropriate bargain
ing unit in the public schools of Pittsfield, Massachusetts.

•

I reject the theory that the same standards used in industry and
trade are applicable here in determining what constitutes an ap
propriate bargaining unit. I find on all the evidence that the
supervision exercised by principals down to supervisors is not
comparable to the supervision exercised by supervisors or fore
man in industry or trade. On the one hand, a supervisory employ
ee in industry and trade is primarily concerned with the best
interests of his employer, and usually has the authority to hire
and fire other employees. On the other hand, principals down to
classroom teachers are primarily concerned with the proper educa
tion of children. They can neither hire nor fire subordinates.
The authority developing upon them is not comparable. The duties
with which principals, vice-principals and supervisors are charged
is to properly educate students. In order to meet this demand, it
is vital that all members of this profession operate as a team.
I can find no precedent for holding that members within the same
profession can be excluded from a unit in which other members are
admitted. To hold that principals, vice-principals and supervis
ors should be excluded from a unit consisting of school teachers
in my opinion would create and perpetuate barriers within the
teaching profession to the detriment of our children and the pro
fession. 78
V/hether we agree or disagree with the above opinion, that there are
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significant differences between private industry and public education
in the area of unit determination,

we must recognize the need to dev

elop some type of criteria or guide lines for determining the appro
priate bargaining unit in teacher-school board negotiations.
One basic standard or criteria that can be employed is that of
"the community of interest of the employees."

This standard of commu

nity of interest has been utilized in the private sector since the
problem of unit determination and the process of collective bargaining
first began.

The National Labor Relations Board has made this stan

dard a central factor in its unit determination cases.

However, like

any standard it is more easily applied in easy cases than in hard
cases.

For example, it is clear that classroom teachers and the school

bus drivers do not belong in the same unit (ttnless the primary function
of the school teachers in that district is driving school buses); but
what about department heads who teach only one class a day, should
they be included m

a teacher unit?
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The NLRB has set down the following rules for determining com
munity of interest:

whether the employees sought to be grouped to

gether are subject to common iirorking rules, personnel practices, en
vironment, or salary and benefit structure.

Such criteria are, however,

more suitable for a check list than for actual decision-making, for
reality is much more complicated.

A good example of how complicated

this problem really is, is the fact that the NLRB often attacks the
problem from the other end.

Instead of asking if any real community

of interest exists, it asks whether any real conflict of interest ex79
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ists among the employees in the proposed unit.

This type of approach

is especially applicable to a small employer or small school district.^
Community of interest, however, may be claimed along several
dimensions, each having its advantages and disadvantages, for example,
the community of interest of employees with respect to conditions of
employment applying particularly to them, the community of interest of
employees with respect to the continuation of a traditional, workable,
and, on the whole, acceptable negotiating pattern, the community of
interest of employees with respect to specialization of occupation
according to a craft or profession, or the community of interest of
employees with respect to the manner of exercising their right of
representation.^1
What constitutes a community of interest or a conflict of in
terest in public education?

This question can most accurately be

determined by the individual school district.

In one school dis

trict department heads may not teach at all, but they may still feel
their association or interest lies with the teachers.

While in

another school district the department heads may spend half their time
teaching, but feel their allegiance lies with the administrators.
same may be true of building principals.

The

One building principal may

feel he is the representative of his teachers to the administration
and another may feel he is the representative of the administration to
his teachers.

While there is a community of interest shared by all

professional educators in their desire for the advancement of quality
education, the important point to consider is do the conflict of in81

Ibid., pp. 2^-25.

terests override the community of interest thereby making it de
sirable to exclude supervisors from the bargaining unit.

The struc

ture of the community of interest in the individual school district
should determine the composition of that district's bargaining unit
or units.
Section 7 of the proposed statute contains guide lines for
unit determination.

Major consideration is given to the community of

interest of the employees as determined by the employees.

It is the

employees who are being represented, and it is their desires which
must remain paramount.

The other guides, the public interest and

ease of administration, provide the boundaries within which the em
ployees can exercise the maximum freedom of choice.

The law is

structured to prevent arbitrary divisions between teachers and admin
istrators, and to permit either group to be represented separately.
Only two units are possible under the statute, an all inclusive unit
or separate teacher and administrator units.
the certificated personnel is possible.

No more fracturing of

By limiting the number of

possible units through legislation the public interest has been pre
served and the ease of administration has been achieved.

The employees'

right to be represented by an organization of their own choosing has
been balanced against the need for stability in the bargaining rela
tionship.

The decision concerning the composition of the negotiating

unit is made at the local level based on the local climate, tradition,
and the effectiveness of past cooperation among school staff members.
The guide lines are flexible enough to allow diversity where it is
necessary and prevent arbitrary standards of uniformity.

These rather

nebulous guide lines are administered by an independent third party
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chosen by the parties involved or the State Education Department.

Bi-Unit Elections
A secret bi-unit election conducted by an independent third
party is the method of determining representation contained in the
proposed statute.

It would seem senseless for any school board to

assume the responsibility of designating a representative, except in
those rare cases where there is no question as to what group repre
sents the teachers.

In the future as the competition between the two

professional teacher organizations increases these cases will become
more and more rare.

An election conducted by an independent third

party has the great value of assuring the integrity of the determina
tion, and this advantage clearly outweighs such disadvantages as the
cost and other disruptions that may occur from campaigning and other
attendant election procedures.
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The independence and neutrality of

the election procedures contained in the Montana Professional Nego
tiations Act for Teachers are seriously limited by the fact, that the
school boards are empowered to conduct the elections.
Employing the secret ballot election to resolve questions of
teacher representation is the only method which insures the free exer
cise of choice on the part of the teachers.

Having the election con

ducted by a mutually agreed upon third party gives further safeguards
for the impartiality and fairness of the elections.

Reliance upon

membership lists, authorization cards, or petitions does not assure the
same freedom as an election because of the lack of secrecy and the
82
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pressure to conform.
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While an election may not be necessary in

every case, the problem exists with who is to determine, if an election
is warranted.

To vest this power with one of the parties involved

in the collective bargaining process, as in the Montana statute, raises
serious questions about the impartiality of such representation pro
cedures.

An independent third party election is a necessary safeguard

for both the school board and the teacher organizations.

Under the

proposed statute, all teacher representation will be determined by an
election conducted by an independent third party, after 30 per cent
of the teachers in that particular district have petitioned for such
an election with the State Department of Education.
The 30 per cent "show of interest" requirement as a condition
for holding an election is an important regulation.

This assures the

school board, v/ho must share the cost of the election with the teachers,
that there is sufficient desire among the teachers to be represented
for the purposes of collective bargaining to warrant an election.
Since the petition is filed with the State Department of Education
rather than the local school board, the proper secrecy is assured the
teachers whose signatures called for the election.
The State Department of Education is designated as the supervis
ing agency in the proposed statute.

Petitions for election must be

filed with the State Department of Education and an independent elec
tion supervisor must be selected by the school board and teachers
within the legislated time period.

If the parties involved can not

agree on an election supervisor, then the State Department of Educa-

83Ibid., pp. 69-70.

tion has the authority to appoint an independent third party.

The

function of the State Department of Education is not to conduct re
presentation elections, but rather to insure that if the requirementsfor an election are.met a fair and impartial election is conducted.
The proposed statute specifies that all representation elections
must be bi-unit elections.

The only basic standards established are

(1) that the superintendent or chief school officer for the district
shall not be included in any bargaining unit, and (2) all other cer
tificated employees shall be given a choice as to the composition of
the bargaining unit (s).

The parties involved and the election super

visor they designate have the ultimate power within the legislative
limitations to establish their bargaining units, and no outside agency
has the authority to repeal or reverse their decisions as to what con
stitutes an appropriate unit.
The bi-unit election allows local self-determination within
categorically defined limits in order to protect the public and allow
the certificated public school employee maximum freedom of choice.

All

the certificated personnel in each school district are divided into
two separate categories; (1) those with teaching or special services
certificates, and (2 ) those with administrative or supervisory certi
ficates and those engaged in supervisory positions.

Those certificated

employees, such as department heads and teaching vice-principals, which
can not clearly be placed in one unit or the other have the right under
the proposed statute to choose to be included in either the "adminis
trative unit" or the "teacher unit", with the "teacher unit" reserving
the right to exclude any category of these certificated employees by
a majority vote.

Once determined by the election supervisor these

k2
two groups of certificated employees vote separately, but simultan
eously, to determine their bargaining representative, and at the same
time vote to be included in one all inclusive unit, or two separate
units, or not to be represented at all.

Either group has the power

by a majority vote to exclude the other and form a separate bargaining
unit.
It is important for the reader to note that the Professional
Negotiations Act for Teachers grants the opportunity of choice in unit
determination to only one limited category of certificated employees,
principals certificated in class 3> and the choice is between the
"teacher unit" or a unit composed of all principals of a single employ
er.

The "teacher unit" is not afforded the opportunity under the

Montana statute to reject or accept this category of certificated em
ployees.

The lack of local self-determination and the arbitrary group

ing of certificated employees greatly reduces the flexibility and the
effectiveness of the Montana statute. The certificated employees
•
should be represented in the "teacher unit" or the "administrative
unit" based on their relationship to the management hierarchy, and the
way the other certificated employees perceive this relationship.

Exclusive Representation
The proposed statute and the Montana statute legislate the type
of representation, rather than allowing the matter to be determined on
the local level.

Exclusive representation is established once an

organization can command a majority vote in an appropriate unit, and
a single employee organization represents the entire personnel in the
negotiating unit.

The employer can not negotiate conditions of em

ployment for anyone in the unit with any other individual or organiza-

k3
tion except the exclusive negotiating agent.
Historically the private sector has moved from the principle of
representation-for-members-only to the principle of exclusive repre
sentation.

The private sector adopted the latter principle in an

effort to eliminate the inter-union rivalries and jurisdictional dis
putes that were causing numerous work stoppages.

By granting exclu

sive representation to the majority representative of the employees,
the problem of splitting off small units from the employee organiza
tion and playing one settlement against the next are eliminated.

A

simplified and systematic administration of employer-employee relations
was made possible by having only one employee organization meeting and
bargaining over wages, hours, and conditions of employment with the
employer.
The public interest in maintaining educational peace and stabil
ity can be best served by the process of exclusive representation.
The teachers are compelled to agree among themselves on a set of bar• gaining proposals before approaching the board, and the board is aided
by the fact that the exclusive representative is responsible for all
employees in the unit regardless of whether they vote for the repre
sentative or not.

The alternative to exclusive representation is an

impracticable arrangement, with school administrations having to face
many organizations, all of which have different requests and demands
for small groups of the total number of employees, while the total
group of employees must be governed by a uniform set of rules and
policies relating to wages, hours, and other conditions of employment.

Election Bar
In order for the process of exclusive representation to be an

equitable procedure the rights of the minority organization must be
protected.

An organization can not be certified as the exclusive

bargaining unit, under the proposed law, unless it has gained the
support of 51 per cent of those employees in the appropriate unit
voting in a representation election.

If no organization receives

such a majority then the unit may not be represented in the formal
bargaining process until another election is conducted.

However,

once an organization is certified as the exclusive representative of
the employees or a particular unit, it must represent all the employ
ees of that unit equally, and not merely at the bargaining table, but
also through the greivance procedures as well.
The rights of the minority organization are further protected
by the simple decertification procedure, which requires only 30 per
cent of the members of the unit to petition the State Department of
Education in order for another election to be held.

However, the

• interest of the public in having uninterupted service is protected
by setting the percentage high enough so that elections will not as a
matter of routine take place every two years and it is also low enough
so the minority organization does have an opportunity to challenge the
organization in power.

A two year election bar has been incorporated

in the proposed statute to protect the public, so that if the bargain
ing representative does change, the inconvenience, no matter how slight
or large, which accompanies an election will occur only once every
twenty-four months.

This election bar, however, applies only after

an organization has been certified the exclusive representative.
The two year election bar allows the school board and the ex
clusive representative to establish a stable and workable relationship

over at least two separate budgetary periods while protecting the
rights of the minority organization and the teachers' freedom of
choice.

The one-year election bar contained in the Montana statute

may not allow sufficient time for the development of a collective bar
gaining relationship, and may further jeopardize this relationship by
allowing the school boards to request representation elections.

CHAPTER V

IMPASSE PROCEDURES

Contract Disputes
Impasses that occur in teacher-school board relations can be clas
sified in two broad categories; (1) disagreements that originate during
contract negotiations, and (2 ) disagreements that arise concerning the
administration of the current collective agreement.

If we accept the

previously stated fact that teacher-school board conflict is unavoidable,
then a means of accommodating these competing interests must be estab
lished.

Collective negotiations provide a democratic process for the

resolution of existing conflicts.

However, as long as either party has

th£ ability to refuse an offer made by the other, some orderly procedure
must exist for reaching mutually satisfactory agreements.

The multistep

dispute mechanism contained in the proposed legislation is designed to
secure mutually satisfactory agreements within the constraints of the
following basic assumptions; (1) the desirability of preserving local
decision-making, (2 ) the necessity of pursuing educational rather than
labor channels to assist local decision-making, and (3 ) the importance of
the right to strike in compelling the employer to engage in good faith
negotiations.

Mediation, fact-finding and advisory arbitration proce

dures are provided to aid teachers and school boards in their attempts to
culminate collective agreements.

If these procedures fail to produce a-
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greement between the parties, then the teachers may collectively with
hold their services.

Teachers and school boards are provided with the

opportunity to solve their disputes with the sanction of public pres
sure and the application of economic pressure, rather than direct third
party intervention.
The procedures contained in the proposed statute for resolving
contract disputes promote voluntary local settlements to the maximum
extent possible, while minimizing coercion against the parties involved.
They provide channels for pressure through which outsiders can assist
the parties involved in recognizing the various points of view.

Unless

one party stands to lose by not agreeing, however, it can not be said
that any real pressure has been applied.

In any economic society, what

is a feasible solution has been determined by economic power.

84

It is

the potential use of the strike looming just off stage, that provides
the pressure needed to produce an agreement.

However, it is only the

resolution of a bargaining impasse which renders the strike a legal wea
pon, and only after all impasse procedures have been exhausted.
The establishment of a three member mediation panel is the first
step in the proposed impasse procedures.

The teachers and the school

board each select a member for the panel and the two members chosen
choose a third member to function as chairman of the panel.

In the event

the two members selected can not select a third, the State Department of
Education will appoint the third member.

The mediation panel acts as a

master of ceremonies in an attempt to enable the collective negotiations
84

Andrew W. J. Thomson, "Strikes and Strike Penalties in Public
Employment," Public Employee Relations Heports, (Ithaca, Cornell
University), p. 2.
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to proceed, without providing specific recommendations for settlement.
If this infusion of direction can not assist the parties in resolving
their differences, then the panel is transformed into a fact-finding
panel.

It should be mentioned at this point that none of the levels

contained in the proposed impasse procedures are a substitute for good
faith negotiations.

They are designed to stimulate collective bargain

ing not supplant it.
Fact-finding differs from mediation in that the function of the
fact-finding panel is not merely to keep the channels of communication
open between the two parties, but to make specific recommendations that
can guide the parties towards settlement.

Once given these guide lines

if the parties involved fail to reach a settlement, then the panel may
make its findings public and bring to bear a rule of reason for shaping
public opinion.

Since the recommendations are not binding this tech

nique does not deprive the parties of all opportunity or responsibility
for settlement.

The real power of the fact-finding panel is the pub

licity accorded their report, and the subsequent pressure generated by
public review of these neutral third party recommendations.
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This logic can be applied as well to the final step of the proposed
impasse procedures, advisory arbitration by the State Department of Ed
ucation.

The Department reviews the dispute and the recommendations of

the fact-finding panel and advises the parties involved of its recommend
ations for settlement.

If the teachers and the school board are unable

to reach an agreement utilizing the State Education Department's recomQ j~

Richard Pegnetter, "Fact-Finding and Teacher Salary Disputes:
The 1969 Experience in New York State," Industrial and Labor Relations
Review, January, 1969, p. 227,
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mendations, then these recommendations are made public.

This procedure

provides the public with a set of guidelines that can be used to eval
uate a teacher-school board impasse and its effect on the public's right
to quality education.

Review by the elected educational officials of

the state provides an important safeguard for the public, and can be an
instrumental factor in forming public opinion.

The resolution of the

dispute is important, but the effect of the settlement on public educa
tion remains paramount.
The State Department of Education performs an important function
in the proposed impasse procedures.

The use of educational rather than

labor or legal channels is derived from the broad scope of the subject
matter permitted by the proposed statute during collective negotiations.
If teachers and boards of education are provided the opportunity to dis
cuss matters which effect the quality of school programs, then the pub
lic has the right to expect that the parties administering the impasse
procedures will have some background in educational research and the
learning process.
The Montana Professional Negotiations Act for Teachers recognizes
the need to protect the public's right to high quality education, but
ultimately places this responsibility with one of the parties directly
involved in the dispute, the local school board.

The Montana statute

establishes mediation and fact-finding procedures, but fails to provide
educational channels to aid in the resolution of disputes.

The senior

district judge of the county in which the employer is located assists
the parties involved if they are unable to select the third member of the
panel.

Noting this exception the mediation and fact-finding procedures

are similar in both statutes.

However, this is where the similarity ends.
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The Montana statute does not provide for any form of advisory arbitra
tion, and categorically bans the teacher strikes.
Once the mediation and fact-finding procedures contained in the
Montana statute have been exhausted, the settlement of the dispute rests
with the local school board.

The teachers do not have the right under

the Montana statute to withhold their services in an attempt to exert
economic pressure to force the board to reach agreement.

The Montana

Professional Negotiations Act for Teachers "...declares that it recog
nizes teaching as a profession which requires special educational qual
ifications and that to achieve high quality education it is indispen
sable that good relations exist between teaching personnel and their
governing boards" (Appendix II).

The Montana statute rejects unilat

eral decision-making because such procedures make it easy to ignore
* legitimate grievances, multilateral decision-making, x^hile considerably
noisier and vastly less comfortable, tends to resolve conflict.

However,

an essential condition of multilateral decision-making is the power of
each of the parties to defend its own interest.

This assumption compels

one to ask the question, how can teachers defend their interests except
by withholding their services?
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The strike, after impasse procedures

have been exhausted, should be legalized because teachers have no other
effective way to influence decisions of vital concern to them.

Logic

compels us to admit that, without the right to strike, collective barO/-7

gaining is little more than militant supplication.

86Paul C. Eggleston, "Collective Negotiations and the Public In
terest," (paper presented in partial fulfillment for. course ILH 607,
Cornell University, 1968), p. 8 .
8 7 Ibid.,

p. 1 0 .
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Grievance Procedures
The Montana Professional Negotiations Act for Teachers does not
provide a procedure for dealing with disputes introduced through the ad
ministration of the collective agreement.

No provision is included in

the Montana statute permitting collective agreements to contain grie
vance procedures, or prohibiting them from containing such procedures.
The proposed statute, however, specifically grants teachers and school
boards the opportunity to develop local grievance procedures that may
terminate in binding arbitration.

If the local contract does not in

clude binding arbitration as the final step in their grievance machinery,
then the proposed statute permits either party to request the State
Department of Education to arbitrate the grievance after the local
grievance procedures have been exhausted.

Disputes over terms of an

initial or renewed collective agreement do not constitute a grievance,
and are excluded from this procedure.
No teacher organization can afford to leave the interpretation of
the collective agreement to the school administrators; indeed simple
justice would dictate that all employees be protected by the right to
grieve with the ultimate decision to be made by a neutral third party
should the grievance proceed that far.
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According to the American

Association of School Administrators,
In every employment relationship, however enlightened and democratic
the administration, grievances and dissatisfactions will arise. A
well-conceived procedure for grievance adjudication which will re
solve the dissatisfactions and redress the legitimate grievances of
88

Doherty, ’’Letter to a School Board,’* p. 2?3«
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staff members is essential to the efficient and harmonious opera
tion of a school district.°9
An effective grievance procedure, with binding arbitration by an inde
pendent third party as the final step, protects the integrity of the
contract and prevents trials of strength over minor items.

The griev

ance procedures contained in the proposed statute allow maximum freedom
of local determination, while guaranteeing the certificated employees
the right to have their grievances arbitrated by an agency which is in
no way beholden to or prejudiced against any party in interest.

The

public interest in uninterupted educational services is insured by the
proposed statute for the length of any collective agreement.
A grievance procedure provides the judicial process for the ad
judication of complaints "...based upon an event or condition under
# which an employee works, allegedly caused by misinterpretation or inequitable application of an established policy."

90

It represents the

presence of procedural due process within a school district
not be confused with the negotiation procedure.

91

and should

The negotiation pro

cedure is the process for jointly developing employment policies, and
the grievance procedure is one such policy.

While binding arbitration

is a necessary final step in order to insure the equitable processing of
grievances arising from the administration of the current collective agreement, this procedure if applied to contract disputes would destroy
89

American Association of School Administrators, "School Adminis
trators View Professional Negotiations," in Readings in Collective
Negotiations in Public Education comp, by Stanley M. Elam, Myron Lieberman and Michael H. Moskow (Chicago, Rand McNally, 1967), p. 210.
9°Ibid.
9 1 Ibid.

the responsibility of the bargaining parties, and transform the negotia
tors into actors performing for the arbitrator.

Teachers and school

boards would be permitted the luxury of "passing the buck" to the ar
bitrator, and the public and the teachers would be deprived of respon
sible and accountable representatives.

Good faith negotiating would be

replaced by hypocrisy and honesty with deception.
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If compulsory ar

bitration were imposed on the Montana schools, it would be reasonable
to expect teachers and school board members, who are just beginning to
learn what good faith negotiations are all about, to turn their prob
lems over to their lawyers, who in turn, would make a technical presentation before a college professor.
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Right to Strike
The question of allowing certificated public employees to utilize
economic pressure, in the form of a strike, in order to resolve a col
lective bargaining impasse (or prevent such an impasse), revolves around
the balancing of two sometimes conflicting ideals:
making and public welfare.

private decision

Whether in the public or private sector

these two ideals must be dealt with in formulating any policy concerning
the legitimacy of employees to engage in work stoppages.

Since both

these variables are abstract ideals, any decision that is reached in an
attempt to balance these two factors must be essentially a value judg
ment .
92

Charles Cogen, "Compulsory Arbitration," An American Federation
of Teachers Leadership Paper (Chicago, American Federation of Teachers,
AFL-CIO)
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For too long the public and its legislators have been content to
categorically ban strikes in the public sector.

It is time that the

public awoke to the fact that the exclusive use of the "employment cate
gories," i.e. public or private, is no longer a viable concept in deter
mining what group of employees should, or should not, have the right to
collectively withhold their services.

This categorical discrimination

should be eliminated from the field of public education, and this anti
quated strike ban removed for certificated public employees.

Role of the Strike in Traditional Collective Bargaining
The following quotation is taken from Chamberlain and Kuhn's college
textbook on collective bargaining, and expresses the private sector
concept of the role of the strike in the negotiating process.

"...

though collective bargaining does not and need not always result in
strikes, the possibility or ultimate threat of strikes is a necessary
. .
. .
9k
condxtxon for collective bargaxnxng."

Collective bargaining, accord

ing to this theory, is basically a power relationship, with the strike
functioning as the "club in the closet" that enables the joint decision95
makxng process to function. ^

As long as a strike threatens greater

loss to at least one of the bargaining parties, if it disagrees rather
than agrees with the other's demands, there is reason for them to settle.
Without such a threat the employer and the union might continue to dis
agree indefinitely and never bargain seriously, each simply refusing to

9kNexl V/. Chamberlaxn and James W. Kuhn, Collective Bargaining,
(New York, McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 391.
95

Donald S. Cullen, "Negotiating Labor-Management Contracts,"
Bulletin 5 6 , (Ithaca, Cornell University, 196?), p. k.
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give ground in an effort to reach a settlement acceptable to both.
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While collective bargaining is a process of voluntary agreement
this agreement can only be reached when one or both of the parties would
rather accept the other's terms than face the consequences of disagree
ment.

If this view is correct, then it would seem that merely the right

to talk with an employer about v/ages, hours, and conditions of employ
ment is not enough, but some kind of pressure is needed behind the work
ers' demands in order for a bargain to be consumated.

The private sec

tor has chosen the strike as the appropriate sanction to provide the im
petus necessary to produce a collective agreement.

The following quotation

from a bulletin by Cornell Professor Donald Cullen summarizes the above
view point.
Thus, while the strike weapon can be harmful and crude, we don't
know any better way of granting workers an effective voice in re
solving the disagreements that inevitably arise between employer
and employed...this imperfect solution is scarcely unique in our
society. The ballot box, the cash register, and the jury room all
render disastrous decisions on occasion, just as the strike does,
but each provides a means, hopefully democratic, of settling dis
putes that "good faith" and "reason" alone fail to resolve.97
The strike plays a key motivating role in private sector collective bar
gaining.

While the vast majority of collective negotiations end success

fully in a collective agreement without a strike, this is not

to say that

these

agreements would have been reached if employees did not have the

right

98
to strike looming in the wings off stage.

point

where either union or management concludes that the loss to it

Itis only at the

from a strike would be greater than the "cost" of surrendering on the
97
'Cullen, "Negotiating Contracts," p. 5»
^ I b i d . , p.

k.

other’s conditions that an agreement eventuates.

The strike, therefore,

in the private sector is an economic weapon to raise the other parties’
cost of disagreeing relative to agreeing to the first parties* terms.
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Collective bargaining is regarded as a marketing procedure, involving
the sale of labor services, and the right not to contract is supreme .^^

Reasons for Banning Teacher Strikes
Montana public school teachers are placed in a rather perplexing
situation by the Professional Negotiations Act for Teachers.

They are

told that they should elect collective bargaining representatives and
engage in collective negotiations with their employers, but they are
forbidden to utilize the shows of strength which the private sector has
found necessary in order for this collective process to function sucn
101
cessfully.
Most of the traditional arguments against granting government
employees the right to strike rely in some way upon the sovereignty doc
trine.

This concept states that if public employees are allowed to

strike, then we are sanctioning their attack upon the sovereignty of the
state.

This argument centers around the fact that the nature of the

decision-making process is vastly different in the public sector as op
posed to the private sector.

In our democratic system of government,

responsibility for determining public policy, even conditions of public
employment, is vested in the elected representatives of the people, sub99
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Hilderbrand, "Collective Bargaining," p. 44.
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Ibid.
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Eric Polesar, "Public Employees and the Right to Strike," (a pa
per delivered before the Public Personnel Association, Ottawa), (Ithaca,
Cornell University, 196?), p. 9.

ject only to a veto power by the executive, and/or judicial power to
declare legislative acts unconstitutional.

10?

Legislative bodies, ac

cording to this point of view, should not be subject to economic pres
sures exerted by an employee organization.

Public employees should not

be permitted to challenge the ultimate right of the elected lawmakers
to consider and pass legislation, including rules concerning the terms
103
of employment for government employees.'

The strike is not viewed

as a legitimate avenue of expression.
The sovereignty doctrine has been a formidable obstacle in the
path of public employees, but within the last decade it has been weak
ened beyond the point of repair.

The strength of the argument rested

in the proposition that public employers could not delegate or share
their legally delegated authority with any other outside organization,
including an employee organization.

However, if this rather narrow and

legalistic line of reasoning is pursued it would soom be seen that this
logic precludes any type of collective bargaining at all in the public
sector.

Since the issuing of Executive Order #10988 collective bargain

ing, in some form or other, has been recognized as a desirable objective
for all levels of government employees.

Therefore, when the sovereignty

argument is viewed in the context of collective bargaining in the pub
lic sector, it loses much of its previous sting.
Reliance upon the sovereignty doctrine is often supplemented by
waving the doctrine of "protecting the public health and safety."

Pro

fessor Moskow addresses himself to this issue in his book, Teachers and
Unions, when he states:
102
Doherty, "Employer-Employee," p. 18.
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Hilderbrand, "Collective Bargaining," p. 23.
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Some authorities still maintain...that'no strike' statutes are
only constitutional when the health and safety of the public are
endangered. They would have no objection to 'no strike’ legis
lation pertaining to policemen and firemen since this (SIC) would
clearly jeopardize the health and safety of the public. In private
industry, the Taft-Hartley Act recognizes threats to health and
safety only if a national emergency is created by the strike, and
even then only a temporary injunction will be allowed. These au
thorities feel that statutes should at least say that under some
circumstances public employees should have the right to strike.
The proposed statute makes a distinction bet\tfeen what is merely an
inconvenience to the public and itfhat is really harmful to the public
health and safety.

Certificated public employees are placed in the for

mer category, and are granted a limited right to strike.

The public has

a right to expect that those services which they have delegated the gov
ernment, and paid for in advance, should be provided on an uninterupted
basis.

105

While it might be said that strikes by public school teachers

are inconsistent with the public interest in the uninterupted operation
of the public schools, the more fundamental and essential public inter
est must prevail.

The equitable resolution of conflict is more impor

tant to the proper functioning of our society than the dates the schools

,
106
open and close.
If the test of who should or should not be allowed to strike is
that of the public health and safety, rather than that of categorically
public or private employment, then curiously enough, we seem more dependent upon the private sector.

107

If our national survival were at stake
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Doherty, "Law and Collective Bargaining for Teachers," Reprint
197, (Ithaca, Cornell University, 1966), p. 10.
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107
Polisar, "Public Employees," p. 12.

59
in World War II, or the Korean police action, or the current non-war
in Vietnam, the steel plants of our nation and the production plants
of Boeing and Lockheed aircraft companies appear far more crucial, than
a strike by public school teachers.

Even at a time of peace, the pri

vate sector is crucial to our national health and safety, for it is
upon this sector that we depend for all food, clothing, and shelter.
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’Those who assert the unique and critical nature or the public sector as
the rationale for banning strikes in the public sector fail to muster
much of an argument.

To deny public school teachers the right to strike

while patiently enduring strikes in vital private industries, i.e. rail
roads, longshore, and airlines, casts strange shadows over logic and
.. 109
equity.
It is important to note that the opposite side of this argument,
i.e. banning the strike in essential private services as well as in
publice services, would deprive more workers of the opportunity to sig
nificantly influence their terms and conditions of employment.

The dem

ocratic resolution of conflict by the parties involved, at times must
over shadow the need to protect the public health and safety.

This is

not to say that all strikes are necessary and desirable, but rather, if
we accept the principle of joint employee-employer decision-making with
respect to terms and conditions of employment then employees must be
provided with some means of effecting the outcome of these joint decis
ions.

The proposed statute does not provide a perfect solution to this

dilemma, but offers a reasonable balance between these conflicting in-

108_
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terests.

Ultimately) however, the balance depends on the certificated

employees, school boards, legislators, the State Department of Education
and the voting public.
relations in the field

Each has a role to play in promoting harmonious
of public education.

The following quotation is taken from the report of the New York Pub
lic Employee Relations Committee, and expresses two additional reasons
why strikes should not be allowed in the field of public education.
Instead of the constraints of the market place on collective bar
gaining, including
the right to strike, which are in the private
sector, negotiations in the public sector are subject to the con
straints imposed by democratic political processes. A work stoppage
in the private sector involves costs primarily to the direct parti
cipants...On the other hand, a strike by government employees (there
can scarcely be a countervailing lockout) introduces an alien force
in the legislative process. With a few exceptions, there are no
constraints of the market place. The constraints in the provision
of ’free services' by government are to be found in the budget al
location and tax decisions which are made by legislators responsive
to the public will.110
Both of these additional arguments concern the nature of public
employment.

First, the right to strike in the private sector is bal

anced on the employer's side by his right to lock out his employees.

In

the public sector it would be impossible for a government agency to
withhold its services from the public merely in an effort to exert economic pressure against its employees.
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The argument states that by

granting the employees the right to strike when the comparable economic
weapon is not available to the employer, we have created an imbalance in
the collective bargaining relationship between the two parties.

The pro

posed statute prevents this imbalance from occuring by granting the cer110

"The Governor's Committee on Public Employee Relations," Final
Report, (State of New York, March, 1966), p. 15*
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tificated employees only a limited right to strike.

The certificated

employees are permitted to engage in a work stoppage only after all
impasse procedures have been exhausted, and those certificated employees
who collectively withhold their services under any other conditions can
lose their collective representation for up to twenty-four months.
Under these circumstances a strike by the certificated school employees
does not create an imbalance in the collective bargaining relationship.
In fact it is designed to relieve an imbalance in this relationship.
The second issue is that the cost of the work stoppage is born not
by the government employer, but by the public.

Governmental services

are usually not priced, and in many cases the consumer can not signify
that the cost is too high by refusing to buy; he must by law pay the
taxes which purchase these services whether he wants them or not.
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According to this hypothesis the public sector is not subject to the
constraints of the market, and therefore, the economic pressure of a
strike has no place in this kind of system.

This argument fails to

recognize that public education, like any business, is faced with the
problem of allocating limited resources.

A strike by public school

teachers may result in the school district losing state and even federal
aid money, and these represent real market constraints.

The public

schools must compete with other state agencies for the taxpayers* dol
lars.

The current trend by taxpayers of voting against school bond

issues, clearly demonstrates that the public will not routinely accept
increases in the school tax rate.
The above has been an effort to list the major reasons experts give
112
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for banning strikes in public education.
basic arguments:

This list centers around three

(1) the sovereignty doctrine; (2 ) the health and safe

ty doctrine; and (3) the unique nature of the public sector.

The reasons

for banning strikes in public education are too numerous to list in their
totality, but all of the reasons eventually can be traced in whole or
part to one of the above general reasons.

Reasons for Granting Teachers a Limited Right to Strike
There appears to be no deep rooted legal obstacles to granting
Montana public school teachers the right to strike.

The Montana legisla-

tures* recognition of a conditional right to strike for nurses

113

con

quered the legality of the constitutional argument of the sovereignty
doctrine for all public employees in the state.

There can be no doubt

that the legislature is free to provide by statute that public school
teachers may enforce their right to collective bargaining by arbitration
or a strike.

Those who base their opposition to the right of teachers

to strike upon the Montana statutes that currently prohibit such action,
will find that laws and precedents, like everything else, change with
events.

Current legalisms can never be an acceptable substitute for

clear thinking.

Un

A limited right to strike for teachers has been

established in three states:

Hawaii, Pennsylvania, and Vermont.

Labor disputes simply can not be legislated away.
diagnose the ailments but can not cure them.
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Legislation can

The purpose of collec-
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tive bargaining is to channel conflict, not necessarily to eliminate
conflict, and in order for this process to function properly both par
ties must engage in "good faith" negotiations.

The right to strike is a

necessary condition for free collective bargaining, without which the
employer will only listen and never bargain over employee demands.

Tea

chers will never be fairly represented at the bargaining table until
they have the ability to support their demands.

Collective bargaining

is basically a power relationship, and one in which no decision, other
than an employer's unilateral decision, will be reached unless some type
of sanction is available to the workers.

"Thus, it can be seen that

while strikes may be abhorent to the public and damage the image of
public employees generally, they have proven a benefit to the employees
and organizations involved."
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This quotation taken from a committee report of public employees
in the Civil Service Employees Association upon voting unanimously to end
their nineteen year old no-strike pledge crystalizes the reason why the
strike is the most important type of sanction available to employees.

Tea

chers, along with other public employees, have discovered that the strike
works.

There is not now and never can be a substitute for the right of

employees to withhold their labor in order to advance their interests.

"*!18

No satisfactory alternative has yet been advanced to compel the employer to
bargain in good faith.

The strike crystalizes that relative economic

power which is the final determinant in making private agreements.
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Although the right to strike may be circumscribed in some instances

^^Polesar, "Public Employees," p.
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in the private industry, its availability for use as an ultimate weapon
is not supplanted by the Taft-Hartley law.

The proposed statute at

tempts to follow this procedure by legalizing the use of the strike
only after the prescribed settlement procedures have been exhausted.
This procedure provides teachers and school boards with every oppor
tunity to negotiate a settlement, while protecting the public's interest
in uninterupted public education.

Since public education is a broadly

used service, public opinion can enter as a new influence of ponderate
importance to both sides in reckoning their respective costs of agreement or disagreement.
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While traditionally public opinion is slow to

mobilize, community pressure may be stimulated by the fact that parents
can no longer send their children to school, but must keep them home.
The fact-finding report and the recommendations of the State Department
of Education are designed to provide the public with the tools necessary
to intelligently evaluate an impasse.

Given this set of circumstances

the public interest and concern should be easier to generate and apply
in order to help the parties involved reach an agreement.
The reasons for granting certificated public employees a limited
right to strike, therefore, rests on the previously advanced argument
that collective negotiations are desirable in the field of public educa
tion, and that the right of certificated public employees to collectively
withhold their services is necessary in order for this joint decision
making process to function.
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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION
This study is an examination of the sections of the Montana Pro
fessional Negotiations Act for Teachers that deal with the scope of
bargaining, unit determination, and impasse procedures.

Their projected

effect on the field of collective negotiations in public education is
compared with the corresponding sections contained in a proposed collec
tive bargaining statute.

The two statutes differ significantly in each

of the three areas.
One of the fundamental differences between the two statutes is
the role of the State Department of Education in the collective negotia
tion process.

The proposed statute utilizes the State Department of

Education as the controlling agency for all phases of the proposed leg
islation, thereby enabling the elected state education officials to
directly influence the course of collective educational negotiations in
the state.

The position assumed by the State Department of Education

under the proposed statute is predicated on three basic assumptions; (1)
public education is a unique enterprise, (2) collective teacher action
and quality education can not be considered as completely independent
phenomenon, and (3 ) teachers should be permitted to pursue professional
objectives through collective negotiations.

Given these assumptions

the proposed statute provides educational channels rather than legal or
labor channels for the administration of the statute and the resolution
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of impasse.

Since collective teacher action can directly effect the

quality of public education, the public interest in the advancement of
public education dictates that those individuals administering the
law have a background in educational research and the learning process.
The Montana statute incorporates the first of the above assump
tions, but rejects the others by employing legal channels for dispute
resolution and limiting the scope of collective negotiations.

The teach

er organizations are permitted to bargain solely over wages and working
conditions, and are forced to accept the role of merely economic repre
sentatives.

The Montana statute therefore compels teachers to perceive

their role in the educational system as predominately an employee-employer relationship.

Their organizations will pursue the private sector

approach to collective bargaining, and employ their collective power to
demand action or inaction along a particular line with primary emphasis
being given to the concerns of the membership.

While recognizing the

uniqueness of public education, the Montana statute fails to exploit the
mutual relationship, that transcends the normal employee-employer rela
tionship, in which teachers, administrators, and school boards strive to
provide the best possible education for the children of their district.
Collective negotiations can provide an orderly means of bilateral deci
sion-making where teachers and school boards can pool their expertise
for the advancement of education, if teachers are permitted to bargain
over professional issues.

When teachers perceive their role as that of

a professional, then collective negotiations can become an avenue for the
expression of their competence on educational issues.

The effect that

collective negotiations will have on the quality of public education
will to a large extent be determined by the teachers’ self-image.
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The unit determination section of the Montana statute does not al
low the certificated employees maximum freedom of local determination.
The statute allows class 3 principals to form a separate unit, but does
not grant the teachers the option of excluding them.

The proposed sta

tute sets forth a set of guide lines for unit determination and places
emphasis on the community of interest of the employees as determined by
the employees.

A bi-unit election procedure is employed where the pro

posed supervisory and teacher units vote simultaneously to determine
their representatives.

One unit can be formed only if both of the pro

posed units concur.
The Montana statute places the integrity of the recognition pro
cedures in a precarious position by allowing one of the parties involved,
the local board of education, to determine the teacher representative.
The integrity of the determination is protected in the proposed statute
by requiring that an independent third party election be conducted before
an exclusive representative can be certified.

The proposed statute con

tains a tvro year election bar, with the teachers having the exclusive
right to call for another election, while the Montana statute contains
a one year election bar.

This bar does not allow sufficient time for

the development of a collective bargaining relationship and this rela
tionship is further jeopardized by allowing the school board to request
representation elections.
The impasse procedures contained in the two statutes differ not
only in the channels employed to resolve disputes (i.e. educational vs.
legal) but in the use of advisory arbitration and the right to strike.
The proposed statute and the Montana statute utilize similar mediation
and fact-finding procedures, but the proposed statute also includes an
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advisory arbitration procedure by the State Department of Education.
After this additional procedure has been exhausted the teachers are
permitted to engage in a legal work stoppage.

This limited right to

strike protects the public's interest in uninterupted educational ser
vices, while allowing the more fundamental and essential public interest
to prevail in the equitable resolution of conflict.

However, in order

for joint decision-making to function the employees must have some sanc
tion available to support their demands.

The limited right to strike

provides the public school teachers with the means necessary to compel
the school boards to engage in good faith negotiations.

Without the

right to strike, collective negotiation in public education becomes
little more than militant supplication.
While both the Montana statute and the proposed statute support
the concept of collective negotiations in public education, the future
of teacher-school board relations depends on more than a single tech
nical process for the advancement of education.

APPENDIX I

A PROPOSED ACT CONCERNING THE RIGHT OF CERTIFICATED PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES TO NEGOTIATE COLLECTIVELY WITH BOARDS OF EDUCATION

A BILL FOR AN ACT TO PROVIDE PROCEDURES FOR REPRESENTATIVE ORGANIZA
TIONS OF CERTIFICATED PUBLIC SCHOOL EMPLOYEES TO NEGOTIATE COLLECTIVE
LY WITH THE PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICTS OF THE STATE WITH REFERENCE TO
TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT, INCLUSIVE OF GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES,
WITH THE EXPLICIT INTENT OF PRODUCING A WRITTEN AGREEMENT.

BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF MONTANA:
Section 1.

Statement of policy and purpose.

In pursuance of

the duty imposed upon it by the constitution to promote public schools
and to adopt all means necessary and proper to secure to the people
the advantages and opportunities of education, the legislative assem
bly hereby declares that it is the public policy of the state and the
purpose of this act to promote harmonious and cooperative relation
ships between certificated public school employees and the public by
assuring effective and orderly operation of the public school system.
These policies are best effectuated by (1) granting certificated public
school employees the right of organization and representation, (2 ) re
quiring the public school districts of the state to negotiate with and
enter into written agreements with the certified representative of the
certificated public school employees, (3 ) channeling the resolution of
69
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disputes between certificated public school employees and public school
districts through the State Department of Education, and

(b) granting

certificated public school employees the right to strike under the pro
visions of this act.
Section 2.

Definitions.

As used in this act:

(1) The term "certificated employee" includes any person employed
by a public school district in a position which requires a certificate
issued by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction.
(2) The term "employer" means a school district as defined in
Section 75-6501, R. C. M. 19^7(3) The term "board" means any public school board of trustees.
(4) The term "terms and conditions of employment" means salaries,
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.
(5) The term "employee organization" means an organization of any
kind having as its primary purpose the improvement of the terms and con
ditions of employment of certificated employees.
(6) The term "administrator" means any certificated employee who
is employed by a public school district in an administrative capacity
and who devotes at least fifty per cent of his employed time to adminis
trative duties.
(7) The term "supervisory employee" means any individual having
authority in' the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend,
lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other
employees, or the responsibility to assign work to and direct them, or
to adjust grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if,
in connection with the foregoing, the exercise of such authority is not
merely of a routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of indepen
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dent judgment. »
(8) The term "appropriate unit" means the unit designated to be
appropriate for the purpose of collective negotiations and will be
composed of all or part of the certificated employees of a single
employer, below the rank of superintendent.
(9) The term "certified" means official recognition by the
State Department of Education of an employee organization as the ex
clusive representative for all the employees in an appropriate unit.
(10) The term "strike" means any work stoppage by a certificated
employee which interferes with the operation of a school or schools,
which includes abstinence in whole or part from the full, faithful
and proper performance of the duties of employment, for the purpose
of inducing, influencing or coercing an employer to change any terms
or conditions of employment.
Section

Right of organization.

Certificated employees shall

have the right to form, join and participate in, or to refrain from
forming, joining or participating in, any employee organization of
their own choosing.
Section *f.

Right of representation.

Certificated employees

shall have the right to be represented by employee organizations to
negotiate collectively with their employers in the determination of
their terms and conditions of employment, and the administration of
grievances arising thereunder.
Section 5*

Recognition of bargaining agent.

Boards are hereby

empowered to recognize employee organizations as the sole and exclu
sive bargaining agent for all certificated employees in the appropriate
unit, and to negotiate and enter into written agreements with such em-
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ployee organizations in determining terms and conditions of employment.
Section 6.

Obligation to bargain.

(1) Where an employee organization has been certified pursuant to
the provisions of this act, the board shall be required to negotiate
collectively and enter into written agreements with said employee or
ganization in determining terms and conditions of employment.
(2) It shall be the obligation of the board and the employee or
ganization or their representatives to meet and confer in good faith
concerning the terms and conditions of employment.
(3) Such good faith negotiations and meetings shall begin within
ten days after the receipt by the board of written notice from the bar
gaining agent of the certificated employees requesting a meeting for
negotiating purposes.

(k) It shall be the mutual obligation of the board and the em
ployee organization or their representatives to participate in good
faith in mediation and fact-finding required by this act.
Section 7.

Guide lines for unit determination.

(1) The negotiating unit shall be established in accordance with
the following criteria:

the public interest} the community of interest

of employees; the ease of administration; and the wishes of the employ
ees.
(2) The appropriate unit shall involve consideration of the max
imum freedom of choice and community of interest of the employees, in
so far as these are compatible with the public interest.
Section 8.
(1)

Election Procedures.
The board and the representatives of the employee organization

(s) shall jointly select an independent third party to conduct a repre-

7H
sentation election wiwn thirty

y&f aant of fcho certificated employees of

that district hove petitioned for m»oH on otnctioa with the State De
partment of Education.
(2) The decisions of the independent third party on the election
proceedings shall be binding on both parties.

If no independent third

party can be chosen by the parties involved sixty days after the peti
tion for the election has been submitted to the State Department of
Education, then the State Department of Education will appoint said
third party.
(3) The election shall be a bi-unit election.

The unit designated

as the "teacher unit" and the unit designated as the "administrative
unit" shall hold separate, but simultaneous elections in order to deter
mine which employee organization should represent them or if no employee
organization should represent them.

Each unit will use a separate se

cret ballot in a separate voting place to select a negotiating repre
sentative.

(k) If a category of supervisory employees desires not to be re
presented with the teachers in the "teacher unit" it must submit to the
election supervisor a majority petition of those certificated employees
that are classified by the election supervisor as belonging to that
particular supervisory category at least ten days prior to the election.
(5 ) If the "teacher unit" desires the exclusion of any category of
supervisory employees it must submit to the election supervisor a major
ity petition of all the other members of the "teacher unit" exclusive of
the members who are in the category being considered for exclusion at
least ten days prior to the election.
(6) A petition consisting of ten per cent of the members of the

?k
proposed unit is necessary in order to have the name of an employee or
ganization placed on the ballot.
Section 9.

Types of Representation Units.

(1) The unit shall be of local self-determination within categor
ically defined limits.
(2) A unit could be composed solely of all certificated employees
of a single employer below the rank of superintendent.
(3) A unit could be composed solely of all certificated employees
employed and engaged in positions requiring only a teaching or special
services certificate.

(k) A unit could be composed solely of all administrators below
the rank of superintendent.
(5) Any group of supervisory employees may as a group reject the
''teacher unit” and not be represented or be represented with the "admin
istrative unit".
(6) Any group of supervisory employees excluded by the "teacher
unit” may be represented with the "administrative unit" or not be
represented.
(7) Unit 9(2) can only exist if a majority of both the "teacher
unit" and the "administrative unit" vote for such a unit to be estab
lished.

If either unit calls for a separate unit, said unit must be

established.
Section 10.
(1)

Certification of bargaining agent.

If any employee organization shall receive more than fifty

per cent of the recorded votes by the certificated employees of an ap
propriate unit, then said employee organization shall be certified as
the exclusive bargaining agent for that appropriate unit for not less
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than two years from the date of the election.
(2)

No employee organization shall be certified as the represen

tative of the certificated employees except after an election.
Section 11.

Unfair practices.

(1) Employers, their agents or representatives are prohibited from
the following unlawful acts:
(a) interfering with, restraining or coercing certificated em
ployees in the exercise of the rights granted in this act;
(b) encouraging or discouraging membership in any employee or
ganization in regard to hiring or tenure of employment or any terms or
conditions of employment;
(c) dominating or interfering with the formation, existence, or
administration of any employee organization;
(d) refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with the bar
gaining agent of its certificated employees as provided in Section 6;
(e) discharging or otherwise discriminating against an employee
because he has signed or filed an affidavit, petition, or complaint or
given information or testimony under this act;
(f) refusing toreduce to writing and sign an agreement arrived
at through negotiation and discussion.
(2) Certificated employees or employee organizations, their agents
or representatives, are prohibited from the following unlawful acts:
(a) interfering with, restraining or coercing certificated em
ployees in violation of their rights guaranteed by this act;
(b) refusing to bargain collectively in good faith

with the

board or its bargaining agent as provided in Section 6;
(c) instituting, maintaining, or participating in a strike
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against any employer, or picketing any school or school facility or to
induce a strike because of any controversy except as provided in Sec
tion 16.
(3)

Violations of this section may be injoined upon written com

plaint of any party effected by any such violation in so far as the
State Department of Education confers.
Section 12.

Ratification of agreements.

All professional nego

tiation agreements reduced to writing and executed by an employer and
the employee organization must be ratified by a majority of the cer
tificated employees in the appropriate unit before becoming binding
upon the parties.

If a professional negotiation agreement is executed

by a professional negotiation agent of the employer it must be ratified
by a majority of the board.
Section 13»

Service fees.

(1) The certified employee organization shall in a written state
ment specify an amount of reasonable service fees necessary to defray
the costs for its services rendered in negotiating and administering an
agreement.

The service fee shall be computed on a pro rata basis among

all certificated employees contained in the appropriate unit and must be
ratified by a majority of the certificated employees in said unit.
(2) The board upon receiving written notification from the cer
tified employee organization that the specified service fee has been
ratified shall deduct from the payroll of every certificated employee
in the appropriate unit the amount of service fees and remit the amount
to the exclusive representative.
(3) The deduction permitted by this section shall extend to any
employee organization that is certified as the exclusive representative
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of an appropriate unit.

If an employee organization is no longer the

certified representative of the appropriate unit, the deduction shall
terminate.
Section 1^f.
(1)

Negotiation Procedures.

The board and the certified employee organization shall meet

at reasonable times and shall negotiate in good, faith with respect to
terms and conditions of employment.
(2) Any mutual agreement reached by the representative of the
board and the certified employee organization shall be reduced to
writing.
(3) The board shall have authority to enter into written agree
ment with the certified employee organization setting forth a grievance
procedure culminating in a final and binding arbitration, to be invoked
in the event of any dispute concerning the interpretation or application
of a written agreement.

In the absence of such a procedure, either

party may submit the dispute to the State Department of Education for
a final and binding decision.

A dispute over the terms of an initial

or renewed agreement does not constitute a grievance.
Section 15.
(1)

Impasse Procedures.

If, after fifty (50) days following the commencement of nego

tiation between the employer and certified employee organization or
their designated representatives an agreement can not be reached upon
any issue or issues presented, either party may notify the other and
the State Department of Education in writing that it desires to pre
sent the issue or issues to a mediation panel.

The mediation panel

shall consist of three (3) persons who are residents of the state in
which the employer is located, one to be selected by the certified em
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ployee organization, and one to be selected by the employer, and the
third to be selected by the first two named, who shall act as chairman
of the panel.

Each party shall select its panel member within ten (10)

days after such notification.

If the members selected by the parties

are unable to agree upon the third member within ten (10) days from
the date of their selection, then the third member shall be selected
by the State Department of Education.

Negotiations shall thereupon

continue before the mediation panel.
(2) If an agreement has not been reached by the parties within
twenty (20) days after the presentation before the mediation panel has
commenced, the panel shall make findings of fact and recommendations
concerning the issues discussed and shall serve a copy upon both par
ties within five (5) days after such twenty (20) day period.

Within

five (5) days following mailing of such findings and recommendations,
the parties must notify in writing the State Department of Education
and each other whether or not they accept the findings and recommenda
tions of the panel.
(3) Unless both parties do so accept, the panel shall publicize
its findings of fact and recommendations in such manners it deems ad
visable.

Not less than five (5) nor more than ten (10) days after

such publication of the findings of fact and recommendations of the
panel, the parties shall again notify in writing the State Department
of Education and each other whether or not they accept the recommenda
tions of the panel.

(k) The State Department of Education shall make public its re
commendations on the issue or issues in dispute ten (10) days after it
is notified in accordance with section 15 (3)* the parties shall notify
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in writing the State Department of Education and each other whether
or not they accept the recommendations of the State Department of
Education.
(5) The parties may further negotiate and settle the issues at
any time before or after the recommendations of the panel.

Each party

shall pay the expenses of its selected member of the panel and both
parties shall share equally the expenses of the third member of the
panel and the publication costs.
Section 16.

The Right to Strike.

(1) It shall be lawful for a certificated

employee who is in an

appropriate unit involved in an impasse, to participate in a strike
after:
(a) all of the requirements of section 15 relating to the re
solution of disputes have complied with in good faith;
(b) the certified employee organization

has notified in writing

the employer and the State Department of Education of its intent to
strike;
(c) ten (10) days have elapsed since the recommendations of the
State Department of Education were made public in accordance with sec
tion 15 (*0.
(2) No employee organization shall declare or authorize a strike
of certificated employees which is or would be in violation of this
section.
(3) The State Department of Education shall have the power to re
move certification from any employee organization involved in an unlaw
ful strike for a period of not less than twelve (12) months nor more
than twenty-four (2*0 months from the date of the unlawful strike.

Section 17.

This act shall not operate so as to annul, modify or

preclude the renewal or continuation of any lawful agreement heretofore
or hereafter entered into between a board and certified employee or
ganization in accordance with the procedure provided in this act.
Section 18.

Severability*

This apt shall be severable, and

should any part or provision hereof be declared unconstitutional by a
competent court, such declaration will not invalidate the remaining
provisions hereof.

APPENDIX II

MONTANA

PROFESSIONAL NEGOTIATIONS ACT FOR TEACHERS
AN ACT RELATING TO THE TEACHING PROFESSION, RECOGNIZING THE RIGHT OF
TEACHERS TO JOIN ORGANIZATIONS OF THEIR CHOOSING, PROMOTING COOPERATION
AND DISCUSSION BETWEEN SCHOOL BOARDS AND TEACHERS, ESTABLISHING PROFES
SIONAL NEGOTIATION PROCEDURES, RECOGNIZING BARGAINING REPRESENTATIVES.

BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF MONTANA:
Section 1.

Short title.

Sections 1 through

of this act shall

be known as the "Professional Negotiations Act for Teachers."
Section 2.

Declaration of policy and purpose.

In pursuance of

the duty imposed upon it by the constitution to provide a system, of free
public schools and to adopt all means necessary and proper to secure to
the people the advantages and opportunities of education, the legisla
tive assembly hereby declares that it recognizes teaching as a profes
sion which requires special educational qualifications and that to ac
hieve high quality education it is indispensable that good relations
exist between teaching personnel and their governing boards.

It is,

therefore, the policy of this state to recognize the rights of profes
sional school employees to form, join, or assist professional employees'
organizations to negotiate with their governing boards regarding the
terms and conditions of professional service and to confer and consult
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in other matters for the purpose of establishing, maintaining, protect
ing and:improving educational standards, and to establish procedures
which will facilitate and encourage amiable settlement of disputes.

It

is further recognized that the authority of public school district
boards of trustees is established by law and a district board of trus
tees has final authority for determining policies for the operation of
public schools under its jurisdiction which are not inconsistent with
law.
Section 3.

Definitions.

As used in this act* unless the context

clearly requires otherwise:
(1) "Teacher” means an individual certificated in class 1, 2,

k or

5 as provided in section 75-6006, R.C.M. 19^7*7but shall not include
such certificated individuals who are not currently under contract to
perform classroom teaching; however "teacher” shall include principals
certificated in class 3 who so elect as provided in subsection (3).
(2) "Employer” means a school district as defined in section 756501, R.C.M. 19^7.
(3) "Appropriate unit” means all of the teachers employed by a
single employer.

Principals employed by an employer may elect to be

included in the appropriate unit or may elect to establish a separate
appropriate unit of principals.
(*1) "Board" means any public school board of trustees.
(5 )

"Strike” means any work stoppage by a teacher or teachers

which interferes with the operation of a school or Schools, which ineludes abstinence in whole or part from the full, faithful, and proper
performance of the duties of employment, for the purpose of inducing,
influencing, or coercing an employer to change any terms or conditions
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relating to the employer-teacher relationship.
(6) "Teacher organization" means any organization of employees
which includes teachers in its membership.
(7) "Representative of Teachers" means a representative elected
pursuant to the provisions of section 7*
Section

k. Teachers1 rights. It shall be lawful for teachers

to organize, form, join or assist in employee organizations or to engage
in lawful activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own free choice.
Teachers shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such
activity but shall be bound by a professional negotiations agreement
involving the appropriate unit of which they are a member.

It shall

be the duty of an employer to meet and confer on any proposal advanced
by a representative of teachers, or by a teacher group if no represen
tative of teachers has been selected, if such proposal does not en
deavor to amend the terms of a professional negotiations agreement
then in effect, and nothing in this act shall be construed to diminish
such duty.

However, a representative of teachers selected as provided

by this act, shall be the exclusive representative of all the teachers
in the appropriate unit to meet, confer or negotiate upon all matters
permitted in section 5 and such teachers shall not negotiate individ
ually.
Section 5*

Duty to negotiate and bargain.

It shall be the duty

of all employers acting as a board, or acting by and through a bargain
ing agent designated or employed by the employer, and all teachers, or
a representative of teachers, to meet and confer for professional nego
tiations purposes at the request of either, except as provided by this

Bk
act, to discuss matters relating directly to the employee-teacher rela
tionship such as salary, hours and other terms of employment, and to
negotiate and bargain for agreement on such matters*

The matters of

negotiation and bargaining for agreement shall not include matters of
curriculum, policy of operation, selection of teachers and other per
sonnel, or physical plant of schools or other school facilities, how
ever nothing herein shall limit the obligation of employers to meet and
confer as provided in section

k. Teachers under a professional nego

tiations agreement, or the representative of teachers, shall not de
mand that professional negotiation conferences begin until after
November 1 of the last year such agreement is effective but, if profes
sional negotiation is desired, must serve written notice of intention
to negotiate collectively upon the employer not later than November 1
of such year stating specifically the items to be negotiated.

If such

notice is not served, the employer shall not be required to negotiate
any terms of the employer-teacher relationship for the following school
year.

Professional negotiation agreements in effect at the time this

act becomes effective shall continue to their expiration.

No profes

sional negotiation agreement shall extend for a term of more than two
(2) years.
Section 6.
(1)

Unfair practices.
Employers, their agents or representatives, are prohibited

from the following unlawful acts:
(a) Interfering with, restraining or coercing teachers in any
manner in their right of self-organization or selection of a represen
tative.
(b) Discriminating in regard to conditions of employment when
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the purpose is to discourage membership in a teacher organization.
(c) Refusing to meet, confer or negotiate in good faith with
teachers or the duly elected representative of an appropriate unit of
teachers or with a panel selected upon impasse as provided in section 9,
to discuss or negotiate upon any matter dealing directly with the eraployer-teacher relationship as provided in section *t.
(d) Refusing to reduce to writing and sign a professional nego
tiation agreement arrived at through negotiation and discussion.
(2)

Teachers or teacher organizations, their agents or represen

tatives, are prohibited from the following unlawful acts:
(a) Restraining or coercing teachers in violation of their
rights guaranteed under section

k or interfering in the conduct of an

election as provided in section 6.
(b) Refusing to reduce to writing or sign a professional neg
otiation agreement arrived at through negotiation and discussion.
(c) Instituting, maintaining or participating in a strike or
boycott against any employer, or picketing any school or school facility
to further or to induce a strike or boycott because of any controversy,
engaging in, or inducing or encouraging any individual to engage in, a
strike or refusal to handle goods or perform services or threatening,
coercing or restraining any individual where the object thereof is to
force or require any employer to discontinue doing business with such
individual or to force or require an employer to recognize a teacher
representative not selected as provided in section 7.
(d) Refusing to meet, confer or bargain in good faith with an
employer or its agents or with a panel selected upon impasse as provided
in section 9, to discuss or bargain upon any matter dealing directly
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with the employer-teacher relationship as defined in section 5 .
Section ?•

Selection of teachers’ representative.

Any teacher

organization whose membership includes a majority of the teachers in
the appropriate unit, as verified by affidavit of the secretary of the
teacher organization delivered to the employer, shall be recognized by
the employer as the representative of teachers in the appropriate unit,
however, (1) if the membership of more than one (1) teacher organiza
tion desiring to represent the appropriate unit includes a majority of
the teachers in the appropriate unit or (2) if no teacher organiza
tion's membership includes a majority of the teachers in the appropriate
unit but thirty (30) per cent or more of the teachers in the unit have
petitioned the board, in writing, for a particular representative, or
(3) if the employer questions whether a majority of the teachers in the
appropriate unit desire the representation of a teacher organization
determined by organization membership and applied for an election, the
board or his representative to represent the teachers in the appropriate
unit.

The board shall give not less than ten (10) nor more than thirty

(30) days written notice of the time and place of such election by
mailing to all teachers in the appropriate unit and by posting in the
school or schools where such teachers teach.

The board shall include

on the ballot the names of all teacher organizations verified by affi
davit to include a majority of such teachers, then the names of all
prospective representatives offered by the petition of thirty (30) per
cent or more of the teachers in the unit received by the board not less
than five (5 ) days prior to the date for election, and in either event
the choice of nno representative."

One candidate must receive a major

ity of the votes cast to be recognized as the representative of the
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teachers in the appropriate unit*

If uno representative*' rocoivoo a

majority, no representative shall be recognized.

If two (2) or more

prospective representatives are named on the ballot and no choice re*,
ceives a majority, a second election, after notice, shall be conducted
naming the two (2) proposed representatives receiving the greatest num
ber of votes in the first election.

A determination under this section

by secret ballot shall remain in effect for one (1) year after the date
of the election and thereafter until the employer or thirty (30) per
cent or more of the teachers in the appropriate unit shall apply to the
board for another election.
Section 8.

Ratification of agreements.

All professional negotia

tion agreements reduced to writing and executed by an employer and the
representative of teachers must be ratified by a majority of the teach
ers in the appropriate unit before becoming binding upon the parties.
If a professional negotiation agreement is executed by a professional
negotiation agent of the employer it must be ratified by a majority of
the board of the employer.
Section 9.

Professional negotiation.

If, after fifty (50) days

following the commencement of negotiation between an employer, and a
negotiating agent designated by the employer, and teachers, or a repre
sentative of teachers, an agreement can not be reached upon any proper
issue or issues presented, either party may notify the other in writing
that it desires to present the issue or issues to a panel of three (3)
persons, residents of the state in which the employer is located, one (1)
to be selected by the employer, one (1) to be selected by the represen
tative of teachers, and the third to be selected by the first two (2)
named, who shall act as chairman of the panel.

Each party shall select

88

its panel member within ten (10) days after such notification.

If the

members selected by the parties are unable to agree upon the third mem
ber within ten (10) days from the date of their selection, the senior
district judge of the county in which the employer is located shall
submit the names of five (5) persons to the parties at impasse and each
party shall in the presence of such senior district judge ..alternately
strike one (1) name until only one (1) shall remain.

The teachers or

representative of teachers shall strike the first name.
remaining shall be the third panel member.
continue before the panel.

The person so

Negotiation shall thereupon

The panel may take oral testimony under

oath and shall consider all documents and arguments presented to it.
If an agreement has not been reached by the parties within twenty (20)
days after presentation before the panel has commenced, the panel shall
make findings of fact and recommendations concerning the issues dis
cussed and shall serve a copy upon both parties within five (5) days
after such twenty (20) day period.

Within five (5) days following

mailing of such findings and recommendations, the parties must notify
the county superintendent of schools and each other whether or not they
accept the findings and recommendations of the panel, and unless both
parties do so accept, the panel shall publicize its findings of fact
and recommendations in such manner as it deems advisable.

Not less than

five (5) days nor more than ten (10) days after such publication of
findings of fact and recommendations of the panel, the parties shall
again notify the county superintendent of schools and each other whether
or not they accept the recommendations of the pariel.

The parties may

further negotiate and settle the issues at any time before or after the
recommendations of the panel.

Each party shall pay the expenses of its
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selected member of the panel and both parties shall share equally the
expenses of the third member of the panel and the publication costs.
Section 10.

Employer's right under other state laws.

Nothing

contained in this act shall impair the employer's right to hire teachers
or to discharge teachers for cause consistent with other state laws.
Section 11.

Court review.

An employer, a duly elected represen

tative of teachers, or if no representative of teachers has been selec
ted, then a teacher or group of teachers, may institute proceedings in
the district court for the county in which the employer is located to
restrain the commission of any unlawful or unfair practice as provided
in this act.

Any teacher acting in violation of any court order to en

force the provisions of this act shall be subject to suspension without
pay or dismissal at the discretion of the employer.
Section 12.

Penalty for violation.

Any teacher who violates the

provisions of section 6 (2 )(c) shall forfeit his salary for every day
that he is in violation.
Section 13»

Planning for negotiating sessions closed to public.

Professional negotiating sessions between employers and teachers, or
their representatives, may be open to the public, but meetings of school
boards wherein professional negotiating proposals are discussed prior to
any professional negotiating sessions shall be closed to the public.
Section 14.

This act shall not operate so as to annul, modify or

preclude the renewal or continuation of any lawful agreement heretofore
or hereafter entered into between a board and a teacher organization.
This act shall not preclude the modification of any existing agreement
upon the request of either the board or the teacher organization in ac
cordance with the procedure provided in this act.
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Section 15.

Severability.

This act shall be severable, and

should any part or provision hereof be declared unconstitutional by a
competent court, such declaration will not invalidate the remaining
provisions hereof.
Effective date - July 1, 1971
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